# Navy Round 6 Wiki

## 1NC

### 1NC – T

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must demonstrate the desirability of the resolution either in totality or in a particular instance to meet the necessary win condition of being topical.

#### United States federal government means the three branches of government

USA.gov 13 "USA.gov is the U.S. government's official web portal" http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government - The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.

#### Increase means to make greater.

Merriam-Webster ND

“increase,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase

transitive verb

1: to make greater : AUGMENT

2obsolete : ENRICH

#### Interpretation: The core antitrust laws are only sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.

The Antitrust Division 07 – Law enforcement agency that enforces the U.S. antitrust laws

“Antitrust Division Statement Regarding the Release of the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report,” The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, April 2007, https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press\_releases/2007/222344.htm

The AMC has made many specific recommendations in its report, and the Division is in the process of reviewing all of them. The Division commends the AMC for its three primary conclusions:

Free-market competition should remain the touchstone of United States' economic policy. The Commission's conclusion in this regard is a fundamental starting point for policy makers. Over a century of experience has shown that robust competition among businesses, each striving to be increasingly successful, leads to better quality products and services, lower prices, and higher levels of innovation.

The core antitrust laws—Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 and Clayton Act section 7—and their application by the courts and federal enforcement agencies are sound and appropriately safeguard the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.

New or different rules are not needed for industries in which innovation, intellectual property, and technological innovation are central features. Unlike some other areas of the law, the core antitrust laws are general in nature and have been applied to many different industries to protect free-market competition successfully over a long period of time despite changes in the economy and the increasing pace of technological advancement. One of the great benefits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is their adaptability to new economic conditions without sacrificing their ability to protect competition.

#### We have Two impacts

#### 1. Fairness – absent a predictable stasis, the aff can determine the scope of the debate using an infinite amount of literature bases or experiences. That makes the scope of negative research too broad and makes it too easy to be aff. Fairness outweighs any other impact because debate is a competitive activity, and a skewed debate undermines the value of the energy and research that teams put into winning the competition. It makes the debates determined by a coinflip not research.

#### 2. Clash: it’s the only educational benefit intrinsic to debate and link turns all of their offense. Everyone comes to debate for different reasons and leaves with different skills, but the process of defending against third and fourth level responses is the only way to instantiate any of the benefits of debate and develop a deeper understanding of the content.

#### That outweighs --- we’re cognitively biased to cling to preexisting beliefs, which breeds epistemic arrogance that culminates in Trumpism --- only submitting beliefs for reexamination by others and taking a risk of being wrong cultivates scrutiny.

Resnick 19

Brian Resnick, Science Writer for Vox, “Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong,” Vox. January 4, 2019. <https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication>

\*\*\*Modified with a strikethrough – Raffi

It’s been fascinating to watch scientists struggle to make their institutions more humble. And I believe there’s an important and underappreciated virtue embedded in this process.

For the past few months, I’ve been talking to many scholars about intellectual humility, the characteristic that allows for admission of wrongness.

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier [**to lie**](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/4/20/17109764/deepfake-ai-false-memory-psychology-mandela-effect) and spread false information [incredibly quickly](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/3/8/17085928/fake-news-study-mit-science), we need intellectually humble, curious people.

I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility:

In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive ~~blind~~ [limitations] spots. Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible.

Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words.

We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully.

This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year.

Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as [Mark Leary](http://people.duke.edu/~leary/), a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me.

But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged.

Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here?

It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says.

This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have [grappled](https://philosophynow.org/issues/53/Socratic_Humility) with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.”

Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to [hearing opposing views](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861). They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay [**more attention to evidence**](https://www.templeton.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Intellectual-Humility-Leary-FullLength-Final.pdf) and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly.

When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is [correlated](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51ed234ae4b0867e2385d879/t/5b43b48b03ce6471753c78ba/1531163796071/2018+Pennycook+Rand+-+Cognition.pdf) with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap.

Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth.

One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet.

It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “[I have one of the great memories of all time](http://digg.com/2017/trump-great-memories-of-all-time).” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in [dodging](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/trump-i-have-a-natural-instinct-for-science.html) a question on climate change.

A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness.

Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for [their intellectual brilliance](https://awealthofcommonsense.com/2018/05/when-intelligence-fails-miserably/) — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions.

The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future.

As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this?

We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation.

So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions?

In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility.

First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled.

We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong.

It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great [“Yanny or Laurel” debate](https://www.vox.com/2018/5/16/17358774/yanny-laurel-explained) of 2018 fits the bill.

For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened.

An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the

Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations.

Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is.

“THE FIRST RULE OF THE DUNNING-KRUGER CLUB IS YOU DON’T KNOW YOU’RE A MEMBER OF THE DUNNING-KRUGER CLUB”

Perceptual tricks like this ([“the dress”](https://www.vox.com/2015/2/27/8119901/explain-color-dress) is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one?

That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” [Chris Chabris](http://www.chabris.com/), a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the [challenges of human perception, tells me](https://go.redirectingat.com/?id=66960X1516588&xs=1&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FInvisible-Gorilla-How-Intuitions-Deceive%2Fdp%2F0307459667%2Fref%3Dsr_1_1%3Fie%3DUTF8%26qid%3D1545250306%26sr%3D8-1%26keywords%3Dinvisible%2Bgorilla%2Bbook). When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just [feels true](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/10/5/16410912/illusory-truth-fake-news-las-vegas-google-facebook). (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be [misremembered as being true](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/10/5/16410912/illusory-truth-fake-news-las-vegas-google-facebook), and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.)

Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still [**stubborn**](https://jov.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2613309) about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions.

For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily.

Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore [more threatening](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/4/19/17251752/philadelphia-starbucks-arrest-racial-bias-training)) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people [are less than human](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/3/7/14456154/dehumanization-psychology-explained), we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them.

Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says.

You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise.

An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, [and get it wrong.](https://www.talyarkoni.org/blog/2010/07/07/what-the-dunning-kruger-effect-is-and-isnt/)

When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans [believe](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0200103) they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.)

Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many [of us think](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3149610/) our memories work like a videotape.

Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.”

In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a [co-authored paper](http://science.sciencemag.org/content/336/6080/493) in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too.

One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s [The Thinker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thinker) or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was [catnip](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-critical-thinkers-lose-faith-god/) for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think.

“HOW WOULD I KNOW IF I WAS WRONG?” IS ACTUALLY A REALLY, REALLY HARD QUESTION TO ANSWER

But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a [much larger sample size](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0172636), and failed to find any evidence for the effect.

And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort.

“Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most [media attention](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/losing-your-religion-analytic-thinking-can-undermine-belief/).’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’”

Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it.

But turns out this assumption is [false](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0143723). As [Adam Fetterman](https://www.utep.edu/liberalarts/psychology/people/adam-k-fetterman.html), a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a [few](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0143723) [studies](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886918305336), wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.”

Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be [a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you](https://www.vox.com/2016/2/29/11133822/internet-outrage-explained). Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble.

Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive

But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it.

The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “[replication crisis](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/27/17761466/psychology-replication-crisis-nature-social-science)” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “[ego depletion”](https://www.vox.com/2016/3/14/11219446/psychology-replication-crisis) theory of willpower or the “[marshmallow test](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/6/6/17413000/marshmallow-test-replication-mischel-psychology)” — have been bending or breaking.

I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, [wrote](http://michaelinzlicht.com/getting-better/2016/2/29/reckoning-with-the-past) in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?”

“IT’S BAD TO THINK OF PROBLEMS LIKE THIS LIKE A RUBIK’S CUBE: A PUZZLE THAT HAS A NEAT AND SATISFYING SOLUTION THAT YOU CAN PUT ON YOUR DESK”

What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build.

“What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says [Simine Vazire](https://www.simine.com/), a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.”

And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the [unveiling of new evidence](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/6/28/17509470/stanford-prison-experiment-zimbardo-interview). (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me [angrily](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/6/28/17509470/stanford-prison-experiment-zimbardo-interview), “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”)

Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible.

There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them.

One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis.

That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t.

And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the [Loss of Confidence Project](https://lossofconfidence.com/).

But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily.

“In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.”

We need a balance between convictions and humility

There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety.

When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map.

Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says [Tenelle Porter,](https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/profile/tenelle_porter) a University of California Davis psychologist who has [studied](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15298868.2017.1361861) intellectual humility.

Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice.

“It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says [Michael Lynch](https://michael-lynch.philosophy.uconn.edu/), a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.”

For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility. We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension.

The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture.

“The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.”

To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe.

#### Independently, extra t – can’

### 1NC – Adv CP

#### The United States federal government should increase regulations on private military contractors

### 1NC – DA

#### Expanding scope of antitrust liability kills innovation

Thierer 21– Adam Thierer is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Author of several books on antitrust law; former president of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, director of Telecommunications Studies at the Cato Institute, and a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

(Adam Thierer, 2-25-2021, "Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/540391-open-ended-antitrust-is-an-innovation-killer)

Antitrust reform is a hot bipartisan item today, with Democrats and Republicans floating proposals to significantly expand federal control over the marketplace. Much of this activity is driven by growing concern about some of the nation’s largest digital technology companies, including Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple.

Unfortunately, the calls for more bureaucracy and regulation emanating from all corners of the political world could have an unintended consequence: discouraging the sort of vibrant innovation and consumer choice that made America’s tech companies household names across the globe.

Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) is leading one charge. Klobuchar, who chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, recently introduced the “Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act.” This sweeping measure seeks to expand the powers and budgets of antitrust regulators at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. It also includes new filing requirements and potentially hefty civil fines.

The most important feature is the proposed change to the legal standard by which regulators approve business deals. It would allow the government to stop any deal that creates an “appreciable risk of materially lessening competition,” and it also defines exclusionary behavior as, “conduct that materially disadvantages one or more actual or potential competitors.”

These may sound like simple, semantic tweaks, but – much like some of the other policy ideas currently circulating – they would upend decades of settled law and create a sea change in U.S. antitrust enforcement. This change could undermine business dynamism, innovation and investment in ways that inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses.

Critics of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity by large tech firms include not only Sen. Klobuchar but also Republicans such as Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.). Hawley recent offered an amendment to a budget bill that would preemptively prohibit mergers and acquisitions by dominant online firms. Klobuchar and Hawley believe that M&A skews the market in favor of today’s largest firms, entrenching their market power and discouraging innovation.

History teaches a different lesson. Consider DirecTV and Skype, both once considered innovative market leaders in their respective fields of satellite TV and internet telephony. Both firms stumbled, however, and they might not even be with us today without creative business deals. DirecTV has been partially or fully controlled by Hughes Electronics, News Corp., Liberty Media and now AT&T. Skype has swapped hands multiple times, moving from eBay, to a private investment firm and now to Microsoft.

These were complex deals, and some didn’t work, leading to divestitures. But each was a learning experience that illustrated how dynamic media and technology markets can be with firms constantly searching for value-added arrangements that serve their customers and shareholders. If we make this type of activity presumptively illegal, we’re imagining that government bureaucrats are better suited to make these calls than businesspeople and the consumers who choose whether or not to buy the product.

Worse yet, legal tests like those Klobuchar proposes – “conduct that materially disadvantages potential competitors” – are remarkably open-ended and could be easily abused. The system will be gamed by opponents of deals for business reasons. They will claim that their own failure to attract investors or customers must all be the fault of more creative rivals. That’s a recipe for cronyism and economic stagnation.

Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly unassailable monopolies should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines proclaimed that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and asked, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist.

At the same time, pundits insisted “Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new corporate “Big Brother” that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.

GOP divided over bills targeting tech giants

Today, we know these tales of the apocalypse ended up instead becoming case studies in the continuing power of “creative destruction.” New innovations and players emerged from many unexpected quarters, decimating whatever dreams of continued domination the old giants once had.

Today’s biggest players face similar pressures, and it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically, not through the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation.

#### Big tech is better – key to compete with China

Lee, senior lecturer at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Business and Economics, ‘19

(David S., “Antitrust action risks holding back US tech giants in competition with China,” <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Antitrust-action-risks-holding-back-US-tech-giants-in-competition-with-China>)

But the administration should not forget the law of unintended consequences -- effective antitrust measures could stifle the ability of American tech companies to compete with their Chinese challengers. Presumably, that is the last thing the America First president wants to see.

While antitrust has been used to regulate technology companies before, perhaps most notably Microsoft two decades ago, its application against Amazon.com, Facebook, and Google seems different.

For the last half-century or so, U.S. antitrust law has been underpinned by the concept of maximizing consumer welfare, frequently measured by price to consumers. In regulating big technology companies today, however, a new paradigm has emerged, dubbed "hipster antitrust."

Hipster antitrust looks beyond traditional economic harm and includes wider effects such as wage inequality, data privacy intrusions, and sheer size as grounds to invoke the law.

But the wider the antitrust authorities reach, the more likely they are to damage the tech giants' global competitiveness. This applies especially in the key field of artificial intelligence, where the U.S. and China are world leaders.

AI is the engine powering the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the fuel for that engine is data, lots of data. Such data can only be collected at scale, which conflicts with hipster antitrust notions of size. If American antitrust measures compel large technology companies to shrink or in the extreme, to break up, then the U.S. will find itself at a disadvantage to China.

The idea of size is one of many fundamental differences separating Chinese and American technology ecosystems. Chinese government leaders have clearly grasped that scale matters for the technologies they want to dominate, such as artificial intelligence, as well as for the type of digital governance Beijing is striving to implement.

In the U.S., however, the economic value attached to scale is offset by deep-rooted concerns about privacy, bullying behavior and unfair political and social influence. Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, a popular Democratic Party candidate for the 2020 presidential election, wrote: "Today's big tech companies have too much power -- too much power over our economy, our society and our democracy."

But in China this is not a hot-button political issue. In a recent fintech course I helped lead comprised of students from different countries, mainland Chinese students considered privacy differently than peers elsewhere. Though aspects of privacy are important to Chinese users, many readily understand there are trade-offs in operating on technology platforms.

Chinese technology platforms such as Alibaba and Meituan have developed so-called "super apps" that serve the same functions that users in the West might find by going to different applications on their devices.

Super apps are designed to be convenient to users so they can handle everything from ride hailing, shopping, food purchases, and payment, all without leaving the digital confines of a single app. This has become the dominant way Chinese citizens consume online. With the most internet users in the world, approximately 750 million, super apps also provide Chinese technology companies an incredible amount of data.

In his book, "AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order," technology executive and investor, Kai-Fu Lee outlined four factors necessary to win the AI race: talent, computing speed, data, and government policy. Though the U.S. has an advantage in many areas, that lead is shrinking, and if China does overtake the U.S. in artificial intelligence, it will likely be a result of advantages in data and government policy.

This combination of data and government policy is perhaps best exemplified by SenseTime, widely considered the world's most valuable artificial intelligence startup. SenseTime boasts world leading facial recognition, which is enhanced because it reportedly has access to Chinese government databases, a rich source of data to further develop models.

Chinese companies like SenseTime have excelled in facial recognition, with some reports estimating that there are almost ten times as many Chinese facial recognition patents filed as American. Chinese surveillance technology is already used in the U.S., including New York City.

This widening gap will have broader implications beyond surveillance, security, and policing. Facial recognition technology will also serve as a biometric identifier for finance, retail, and health. With China moving forward aggressively both domestically and abroad in its use of such technologies, American competitors who are pursuing facial recognition, such as Amazon and Google, may not be able to close the growing competitive chasm.

So while American politicians may see antitrust investigations into large technology companies as necessary, there could be a significant impact on America's ability to compete with China.

Google's former CEO, Eric Schmidt forecast last year that China and the United States would lead the bifurcation of the internet into two spheres. Evidence of this splintering is already apparent. What remains undetermined, however, is which of those spheres will dominate.

Large Chinese technology companies, for example Alibaba Group Holding, are already setting-up far-flung outposts by partnering with and investing in local, non-Chinese technology companies around the world. This form of Chinese technological expansion allows Chinese big tech to shape user privacy norms, establish global networks, and attract more users into their ecosystems, all of which leads to increased user activity and ultimately more data.

While China aggressively expands its technological reach and hones its ability through mining evermore data, it is important that U.S. regulators understand that aggressive antitrust sanctions would risk inhibiting American companies from maintaining the scale necessary to compete with their Chinese rivals.

AI supremacy will be a defining feature of superpower status. And if future researchers one day examine how the U.S. lost the war for artificial intelligence, the hindsight of history may show that the current antitrust debate was the fatal turning point.

#### Tech innovation solves

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy 18 – Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council

Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11-12-2018, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/>

Rather, we should think **more broadly** about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts in the balance of power as a primary cause of conflict.

International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but when bargaining breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But shifts in the balance of power muddy understandings of which states have the advantage.

You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power.

For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full displayin its ongoing intervention in Ukraine.

Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, and artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.”

If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power that often causes war.

If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be more willing than previously to initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member.

Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflict through limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear brinkmanship, or simple accident or inadvertent escalation.

This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And the solution is not to preserve second-strike capabilities, but to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly.

When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek to maintain an innovation edge. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states.

These are no easy tasks, but the consequences of Washington losing the race for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just might mean nuclear Armageddon.

### Case

#### Managing things is good – U.S. managing the global order is key to avoid massive transition wars and proliferation – extinction

Wright 20 – Director, Center on the US & Europe and Sr. Fellow, Project on Internat’l Order & Strategy at Brookings

Thomas Wright, director of the Center on the United States and Europe, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution, contributing writer for The Atlantic, and nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment

For seven decades, U.S. grand strategy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus on the United States’ global role. Although successive administrations had major disagreements over the details, Democrats and Republicans alike backed a system of alliances, the forward positioning of forces, a relatively open international economy, and, albeit imperfectly, the principles of freedom, human rights, and democracy. Today, that consensus has broken down.

President Donald Trump has questioned the utility of the United States’ alliances and its forward military presence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He has displayed little regard for a shared community of free societies and is drawn to authoritarian leaders. So far, Trump’s views are not shared by the vast majority of leading Republicans. Almost all leading Democrats, for their part, are committed to the United States’ traditional role in Europe and Asia, if not in the Middle East. Trump has struggled to convert his worldview into policy, and in many respects, his administration has increased U.S. military commitments. But if Trump wins reelection, that could change quickly, as he would feel more empowered and Washington would need to adjust to the reality that Americans had reconfirmed their support for a more inward-looking approach to world affairs. At a private speech in November, according to press reports, John Bolton, Trump’s former national security adviser, even predicted that Trump could pull out of NATO in a second term. The receptiveness of the American people to Trump’s “America first” rhetoric has revealed that there is a market for a foreign policy in which the United States plays a smaller role in the world.

Amid the shifting political winds, a growing chorus of voices in the policy community, from the left and the right, is calling for a strategy of global retrenchment, whereby the United States would withdraw its forces from around the world and reduce its security commitments. Leading scholars and policy experts, such as Barry Posen and Ian Bremmer, have called on the United States to significantly reduce its role in Europe and Asia, including withdrawing from NATO. In 2019, a new think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, set up shop, with funding from the conservative Charles Koch Foundation and the liberal philanthropist George Soros. Its mission, in its own words, is to advocate “a new foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement and military restraint.”

Global retrenchment is fast emerging as the most coherent and ready-made alternative to the United States’ postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence of U.S. forces, this strategy would destabilize the regional security orders in Europe and Asia. It would also increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, empower right-wing nationalists in Europe, and aggravate the threat of major-power conflict.

This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of containment throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between détente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its alliances to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact.

Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the wholesale replacement of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is a careful pruning of its overseas commitments—not the indiscriminate abandonment of a strategy that has served it well for decades.

RETRENCHMENT REDUX

Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of “liberal hegemony,” using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad.

Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of withdrawing from many of the United States’ existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools.

In practice, this approach means ending U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, withdrawing U.S. forces from the Middle East, relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states. As for alliances, Posen has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of NATO, replace the organization “with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement,” and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves.

Since Trump’s election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States’ current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become more peaceful and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars—U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism—as well as the defense budget and overseas bases.

Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. Stephen Wertheim, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, “leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes,” as part of an effort to “deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution.” He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan.

IS LESS REALLY MORE?

The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments.

This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price—and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left—resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war.

A U.S. pullback from Europe or Asia is more likely to embolden regional powers.

The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea.

The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about nuclear proliferation: nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation.

Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim—such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France—while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia.

A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence—the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded Taiwan to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law.

A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 Eurasia Group Foundation poll found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States’ democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.

Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States’ postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia—two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order—would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.

#### Presence is the key internal link – and, causes prolif

Brooks and Wohlforth 16 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University

Stephen Brooks, and William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, *America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World*, Oxford, New York: Oxford UPress (2016), pp. 103-110

General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security.

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear-armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use.

It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally.

Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary:  “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to.

#### The US retains a plethora of advantages in multiple areas of global leadership – solution to new challenges is not total abandonment of the US-led global order but refinement and recommitment of our approach to shaping it

Schake 19

Kori Schake, Deputy Director General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the author Of Safe Passage: The Transition From British to American Hegemony. She served on the National Security Council and in the U.S. State Department in the George W. Bush administration, “Back to Basics: How to Make Right What Trump Gets Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2019, accessed through Georgetown libraries

U.S. President Donald Trump's sharp-elbowed nationalism, opposition to multilateralism and international institutions, and desire to shift costs onto U.S. allies reflect the American public's understandable weariness with acting as the global order's defender and custodian. Over the last three decades, post—Cold War triumph- alism led to hubris and clouded strategic thinking. After the 9/11 attacks, Wash- ington stumbled badly in Afghanistan and Iraq; more recently, Russia has reasserted itself in eastern Europe and the Middle East, and China's economic and military power have significantly expanded. Even among Trump's oppo- nents, these developments have led many to conclude that the only solution is a fundamental rethinking of U.S. strategy.

This is an overreaction. In truth, the pillars of U.S. strategy for the past 70 years—committing to the defense of countries that share U.S. values or interests, expanding trade, upholding rules-based institutions, and fostering liberal values internationally—have achieved remarkable successes and will continue to serve the country well going forward. Although some changes are certainly necessary, the biggest risk now is that the United States will in the process of making those changes scrap what is best about its foreign policy.

In his blunt and often crude way, Trump has proved brilliant at poking holes in pieties and asking pointed questions about long-standing principles. His answers to those questions, however, have been self-defeating at best and dangerous at worst. By revealing what happens when U.S. strategy becomes untethered from the ideas that built the American-led order, Trump's time in offce should serve as a wake-up call—but not as a cause for fundamental change. On the contrary: as the costs of an "America first" approach become clear, advocates of a more traditional, global- minded American leadership will get another hearing. They should seize the opportunity by offering a vision of a reformed and updated U.S. foreign policy. But a new vision of the U.S. role in the world should reaffrm some core principles—namely, that the United States can best achieve its objectives through mutually beneficial outcomes that reduce the need for enforcement and encourage like-minded countries to share burdens.

YOU NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD

For all the panic and self-doubt that the political turmoil of recent years has brought, the current crisis is hardly without precedent. In fact, for most of its history, the United States faced more formidable challenges and had fewer resources than it does today. George Washington would have loved to negoti- ate a multilateral trade deal from a position of economic strength rather than having to bring a fledgling nation into being amid hostility from much stronger states. Abraham Lincoln would have considered banding allies together to counter a rising China an easy day's work compared with passing the 13th Amendment or preventing international recognition of the Confederacy. Franklin Roosevelt would have been right to see managing a glut of capital as less compli- cated than resuscitating the entire U.S. economy.

The United States has the most propitious geopolitical environment any country could hope for: surrounded by oceans and peaceful, cooperative neighbors. The U.S. economy generates jobs and drives technological innovation. The country's hegemony in the global balance-of-payments system is so secure that investors are indifferent to its indebtedness and Washington can impose sanctions on foreign entities and governments with impunity. The United States is a dominant power that other strong states voluntarily work to support rather than diminish—a historical anomaly. Its military is so capable that its adversaries have to operate on the margins of the conflict spectrum, in the realm of insurgency or information warfare. The country's cultural products are appealing and accessible, and its language serves as the lingua franca for international transactions.

#### Prolif is existential

Kroenig 15

Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor and IR Field Chair-Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Senior Fellow-Brent Snowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does it Have a Future?, Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015 pp. 98-125

Should we worry about the spread of nuclear weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created by humankind. A single nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war and post-apocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority. To this day, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a foremost concern of US leaders. Indeed, in his 2014 annual threat assessment to the US Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argued that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to US national security.1 Many academics, however, question the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that the spread of nuclear weapons might actually be beneficial because it deters great power war and produces greater levels of international stability.2 2 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton 1997); David J. Karl, ‘Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/4 (Aug. 2011), 619–41. View all notes While these arguments remain provocative, they are far from new. The idea that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter a larger adversary and keep the peace has its origins in the early strategic thinking of the 1940s. Moreover, a critical review of this literature demonstrates that many of these arguments are less sound than they initially appear. This essay argues that, contrary to the claims of the optimists, the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to US national security. It begins with a brief review of the intellectual history of proliferation optimism to show how parochial interests and resource-constrained environments incentivized strategic thinkers in France and in the US Navy to develop and promote key pillars of the proliferation optimism school. Next, it identifies the core weaknesses of proliferation optimism as a comprehensive framework for understanding the effects of nuclear proliferation on international politics, including its: oversimplification of nuclear deterrence theory and corresponding underestimation of the potential for nuclear war, internal logical contradictions, and limited ability to speak to the concerns of policymakers. Finally, it articulates the myriad threats posed by nuclear proliferation, including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In so doing, this essay makes several contributions to our understanding of proliferation optimism and nuclear weapons proliferation. First, it proposes a novel argument about how bureaucratic considerations and resource constraints were conducive to the intellectual diffusion of proliferation optimism. Second, it responds to recent calls for proliferation pessimists to stop ‘playing small ball’ and to rebut head on proliferation optimists’ core claims about nuclear deterrence theory and stability.3 3 Frank Gavin, ‘The Ivory Tower–Policy Gap in the Nuclear Proliferation Debate’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (Aug. 2012), 573–600. View all notes Third, this essay reviews the many reasons why US officials should oppose the spread of nuclear weapons, regardless of whether optimists are correct in their central claims about nuclear weapons and international stability. While many of these threats have been identified and reviewed in greater detail by others, this essay aims to usefully bring them together in a single work as part of an overarching critique of the proliferation optimism position. An Intellectual History of Proliferation Optimism The origins of the key pillars of proliferation optimism can be found in early Cold War debates about nuclear strategy. These pillars include the ideas that a small nuclear arsenal capable of targeting an enemy’s cities is sufficient for deterring a powerful adversary and that nuclear wars, because they would be so devastating for everyone involved, will never be fought. These ideas stood in stark contrast to other strands of deterrence thinking that emphasized the importance of nuclear force posture, counterforce targeting, strategic instability, nuclear brinkmanship, inadvertent and accidental nuclear escalation, and limited nuclear wars.4 4 Lawrence Freedman. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003). View all notes It is noteworthy that some (but by no means all) of the most influential early advocates of minimum deterrence and proliferation optimism (indeed, as we will see below, these ideas are mutually reinforcing) cannot truly be understood without reference to the parochial interests and resource-constrained environments in which the strategic thinkers who developed them operated. Early Academic Writing Shortly after the first use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, US strategists began to grapple with the question of what the atomic bomb meant for international peace and security. The first answer given is one that presaged the contemporary proliferation optimism literature, namely, that nuclear weapons are an ‘absolute weapon’ that are terrifyingly destructive, invulnerable to enemy attack, and that render great power war obsolete.5 5 See, for example, Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapons: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1946). View all notes Perhaps the first person to articulate this position was University of Chicago economist Jacob Viner in a speech to the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia on 16 November 1945 – just months after the first use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.6 6 Jacob Viner, ‘The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International Relations’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, delivered 16 Nov. 1945. View all notes In the speech, Viner argued that counterforce nuclear targeting would be useless and disarming first strikes impossible. In doing so, he laid the basis for subsequent claims about a minimum nuclear posture being sufficient to deter a more powerful adversary. Viner argued, ‘the atomic bomb, unlike battleships, artillery, airplanes, and soldiers, are not an effective weapon against its own kind. A superior bomb cannot neutralize the inferior bomb of an enemy.’ Viner went on to argue that the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons would induce great caution in leaders and possibly produce peace among the major powers. In his words, ‘the universal recognition that if war does break out, there can be no assurance that the atomic bombs will not be resorted to may make statesmen and people determined to avoid war even where in the absence of the atomic bomb, they would regard it as the only possible procedure under the circumstances for resolving a dispute or a clash of interests’.7 7 Ibid. View all notes The proliferation optimism position received further elaboration a few months later in Bernard Brodie’s classic book The Absolute Weapon.8 8 Brodie, The Absolute Weapon. View all notes In great detail, Brodie explained the basic features of the minimum deterrence and proliferation optimism position. He argued that nuclear weapons are invulnerable, ruling out the possibility of an enemy launching a splendid first strike. He also claimed that nuclear weapons have such terrifying effects that they would make war too costly to wage, potentially leading to peace. In his most oft-quoted line, Brodie declared, ‘Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.’9 9 Ibid. View all notes Unlike most optimists writing today, however, Brodie was a fairly pessimistic optimist, holding that nuclear weapons could stabilize great power politics while simultaneously fearing a nontrivial risk of nuclear exchange. Brodie’s most optimistic notions were soon countered in what would become an early incarnation of the optimism-pessimism debate, predating the now-famous Waltz-Sagan debate by over 30 years.10 10 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. View all notes Beginning with a series of basing studies done for the Department of Defense, Albert Wohlstetter, an American strategist working at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, argued that nuclear weapons are not as invulnerable as they appeared to optimists like Brodie. Rather, he argued that the ‘balance of terror’ that optimists had written so eloquently about, was actually quite ‘delicate’.11 11 Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1958). View all notes He demonstrated that US nuclear forces were potentially vulnerable to a Soviet first strike and that this vulnerability could tempt Moscow to launch a nuclear war. His study led to a number of improvements in the survivability of US nuclear forces, including the moving of US air bases beyond the range of Soviet bombers and the hardening of ballistic missile silos. More importantly for our purposes, however, Wohlstetter’s study also undermined a key pillar of proliferation optimism. If nuclear forces were potentially vulnerable, then an enemy might be encouraged to attack, and it was not a great leap from this insight to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would not necessarily contribute to peace. Just as a belief in minimum deterrence supports the idea of a nuclear peace, attention to nuclear vulnerability and counterforce nuclear war necessarily leads to proliferation pessimism. Indeed, it is difficult to find analysts who simultaneously believe that the details of nuclear force posture matter and that the spread of nuclear weapons is inherently stabilizing. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Albert Wohlstetter was a proliferation pessimist. In subsequent writing, Wohlstetter catalogued the potential downsides of nuclear proliferation for US interests, even if nuclear weapons spread to friendly states, such as America’s NATO allies.12 12 Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country’, Foreign Affairs 39/3 (April 1961), 355-87. View all notes First, he identified nuclear war as a potential problem. A few nuclear weapons would not be enough for deterrence, but rather ‘The problem of deterring a major power requires a continuing effort because the requirements for deterrence will change with the counter-measures taken by the major power.’13 13 Ibid. View all notes But, if that investment was not made, deterrence could fail and nuclear war could result. Second, Wohlstetter worried that the spread of nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance would undermine alliance cohesion by making the allied states less interdependent. Third, Wohlstetter forecasted that the spread of nuclear weapons would lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. He criticized US decisionmakers for calculating the pros and cons of nuclear proliferation to an ‘Nth’ state without also figuring in the potential negative consequences of what he called the ‘N+1 problem.’14 14 Ibid. View all notes The optimism-pessimism debate did not remain relegated to the ivory tower for long, however. Shortly thereafter, influential actors in government began adapting the ideas of proliferation optimism to fit their strategic circumstances and advance their parochial interests. The French Force de Frappe In 1960, France entered the nuclear club with its first nuclear test.15 15 Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton UP 1965). View all notes French leaders, including President Charles de Gaulle, did not believe that France could rely on the United States and NATO to provide for France’s security. As de Gaulle would famously ask, would Washington really be willing to trade New York for Paris in a nuclear war? France, therefore, acquired an indigenous nuclear weapons capability that would allow Paris to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Having developed the bomb, however, French strategic and military thinkers were soon confronted with a new problem: how would they use their nuclear weapons? In the early and mid-1960s, France began developing a nuclear doctrine. At the same time that US and Soviet thinkers began articulating the aspects of nuclear doctrine that would come to characterize the superpower nuclear competition throughout the Cold War (counterforce nuclear targeting, limited nuclear options, the importance of assured destruction, the advantages provided by nuclear superiority, and the pursuit of active and passive defenses), France, a medium power operating with fewer resources than the superpowers, was compelled to develop a more modest nuclear strategy. In large part due to its limited means, France developed a minimal deterrent doctrine, in which French military planners aimed to be able to threaten significant damage to Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet invasion of France.16 16 Bruno Tertais, ‘Destruction Assuree: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1982’, in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2004). View all notes Unlike the superpowers, France did not have the luxury of working down from strategy to capabilities, but instead had to work backwards, developing strategy around given capabilities. As French strategic thinker General Pierre-Marie Gallois put it, France pursued a nuclear ‘strategy of the means’.17 17 Ibid., 95. View all notes In the words of de Gaulle, ‘we do not have the ambition to make a force as powerful as those of the Americans or Soviets, but a force proportionate to our means, our needs, and our size’.18 18 Ibid., 86. View all notes Accordingly, the key pillars of French doctrine reflected France’s resource constraints. ‘Deterrence of the strong by the weak’ was the belief that a small state can deter a much larger adversary as long as the smaller state has the ability to conduct a countervalue nuclear attack against the larger state’s cities.19 19 Ibid., 64. View all notes ‘Sufficiency’ was the idea that a small number of nuclear weapons was sufficient for deterrence and that anything more was unnecessary.20 20 Ibid., 86. View all notes France’s small size and lack of strategic depth prevented it from adopting the warfighting postures of the superpowers. As Gallois put it, ‘France has nothing to cede that would not be herself.’21 21 Pierre Marie Gallois, Le Sablier du Siecle: memoires (Lausanne: L’Age d’homme 1999), 402. View all notes France’s vulnerability, therefore, demanded that France launch an immediate and full-scale nuclear attack at the initiation of any hostilities. Unable to build a large enough arsenal to maintain an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union, France aimed only, according to Gallois, to ‘tear an arm’ off the aggressor.22 22 Tertais, 83. View all notes While US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara famously assessed that destroying large portions of the Soviet population and economy was necessary to deter Moscow, French thinkers thought that the Soviet Union could be deterred if France could inflict damage on the Soviet Union roughly equivalent to the destruction of the entire country of France. In the words of one French official, ‘French nuclear forces have been calculated to permit reaching a population of the adversary of the same order as that of our own country. If France were destroyed, our adversary would lose the equivalent of France.’23 23 Ibid., 82. View all notes A lack of adequate delivery vehicles also prevented France from following a counterforce strategy. France’s plans for the development of a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) were canceled due to their expense, leaving Paris with a countervalue option only. As strategist Raymond Barre described, ‘it was the less costly option…France, a medium-sized nation with limited resources, cannot pretend seeking parity with the two great nuclear powers. The only way which is opened to us is that of the current strategy.’24 24 Ibid., 96. View all notes Like proliferation optimists on the other side of the Atlantic, French strategists believed that if a small nuclear arsenal in France could deter the Soviet Union, then the spread of nuclear weapons elsewhere could have a pacifying effect on international politics more broadly. As Gallois argued, a nuclear arsenal ‘increases the risk, counsels discretion, and consequently strengthens the strategy of dissuasion. As atomic armament grows more widespread … the notion of dissuasion will also become more common, each nation practicing it according to its means … It will not be long before we may have to give up war altogether.’25 25 Pierre Marie Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert 1960). View all notes Unsurprisingly, the first generation of proliferation pessimists in the United States was skeptical of French strategy and doctrine. Albert Wohlstetter assessed that if the United States, a global superpower, struggled to develop a survivable nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the Soviet Union, then France, a much smaller power, did not stand a chance of developing a truly independent deterrent. At the end of the day, thought Wohlstetter, ‘The burden of deterring a general war as distinct from limited wars is still likely to be on the United States and therefore, so far as our allies are concerned, on the alliance.’26 26 Wohlstetter, ‘Nuclear sharing’. View all notes In sum, the notion that a few nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter great power war was warmly welcomed and advocated by strategic thinkers in Paris. France’s resource-constrained environment prevented it from adopting anything other than a minimum deterrent posture. France was not the only place, however, where minimum deterrence was advocated in response to the available means. Polaris In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a similar minimum deterrence strand was developing among US nuclear strategists.27 27 This section draws heavily from Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘The US Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Program and Finite Deterrence’, in Henry D. Sokolski, Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2004). View all notes Like in France, circumstances would compel military planners, this time in the US Navy, to argue that a few nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter a more powerful foe, helping to pave the way for subsequent generations of proliferation optimists. In the early days of the Cold War, the US Navy was the only major US military service cut out of the strategic nuclear mission. This would have major implications for service budgets and inter-service rivalries as nuclear capabilities were of paramount importance in the superpowers’ Cold War rivalry and the Navy wanted a foothold in the nuclear game. The Navy sought to edge its way into a role by developing ‘super carriers,’ aircraft carriers suitable for nuclear-armed fighters to take off and land, but the program was cancelled by President Truman in 1949. Then, in the mid-1950s, under the leadership of Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Navy began developing the innovative Polaris submarine launch ballistic missile system (SLBM). Polaris provided the Navy with a nuclear role. Indeed, Burke argued that Polaris’s unique advantages, its greater survivability in particular, made it a candidate to replace the more vulnerable fixed ICBMs operated by the Air Force. Critics in other services soon countered, however, that SLBMs did not meet the requirements of US nuclear strategy. SLBMs, unlike bombers and land-based ICBMs, were not accurate enough to engage in counterforce targeting. Moreover, there were too few submarines to bring sufficient firepower to bear to guarantee an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union. The Navy could not credibly argue that Polaris had capabilities that it did not have, but they could, and did, challenge the prevailing logic of deterrence. In a prize-winning essay, Paul Bracken, a naval commander working under Burke, coined the term ‘finite deterrence’. Bracken, and eventually Burke, argued that the massive nuclear attacks and counterforce targeting envisioned by the Air Force and the Army were unnecessary. Rather, they claimed that a few survivable nuclear weapons capable of destroying enemy soft targets – the precise capabilities provided by Polaris – were sufficient for deterrence. In the end, Burke and the Navy were only partially successful in their bureaucratic battle. While SLBMs became a central element of US nuclear force structure, they did not replace bombers and ICBMs. Arguments about maintaining superiority across the entire spectrum of capabilities were more persuasive in the context of a heating up Cold War. Nevertheless, the ideas of ‘finite’ and ‘minimum deterrence’, developed by Bracken and Burke, motivated in no small part by a desire to advance the Navy’s position in an inter-service competition are alive and well in the writings of today’s proliferation optimists. Contemporary Academic Writing Proliferation optimism received what may have been its clearest articulation by Kenneth Waltz in his seminal 1981 Adelphi paper, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’.28 28 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better’, Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981). View all notes In this, and subsequent works, Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear weapons has beneficial effects on international politics. He maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war with other nuclear-armed states. As more and more states acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, there are fewer states against which other states will be willing to wage war. The spread of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, leads to greater levels of international stability. Looking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period of peace among the great powers. While the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral geographic regions during the Cold War, they never engaged in direct combat. And, despite regional scuffles involving nuclear-armed states in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, none of these conflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the intensity of conflict, according to Waltz, was the direct result of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Following in the path blazed by the strategic thinkers reviewed above, Waltz argued that the requirements for deterrence are not high. He argued that, contrary to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state need not build a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery vehicles in order to deter its adversaries. Rather, he claimed that a minimum deterrent posture of few nuclear weapons is sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he went even further, asserting that any state will be deterred even if it merely suspects its opponent might have a few nuclear weapons because the costs of getting it wrong are simply too high. Not even nuclear accident is a concern according to Waltz because leaders in nuclear-armed states understand that if they ever lost control of nuclear weapons, the nuclear retaliation they could suffer in response would be catastrophic. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to maintain tight control over their nuclear weapons. Not even new nuclear states, which lack experience managing nuclear arsenals, would ever allow nuclear weapons to be used or to fall into the wrong hands. Following Waltz, many other scholars have subsequently advanced arguments in the proliferation optimism school.29 29 For a review of these debates as they pertain to South Asia, see Karl, ‘Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited’. View all notes Indeed, in 2012, Waltz himself argued that nuclear proliferation to Iran would not present a serious threat because a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred.30 30 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb’, Foreign Affairs (July/Aug. 2012), 2–4. View all notes Proliferation through Rose-Colored Glasses The proliferation optimist position has a distinguished pedigree, and provides a useful rationale for actors interested in developing strategic deterrence with limited means, but it provides a weaker intellectual framework for comprehensively understanding the likely effects of nuclear proliferation on international politics. Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists have provided systematic and thoroughgoing critiques of the proliferation optimism position.31 31 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. View all notes Sagan shows that the spread of nuclear weapons leads to greater levels of international instability because: states might conduct preventive strikes on the nuclear facilities of proliferant states, proliferant states might not take the necessary steps to build a secure, second-strike capability, and organizational pathologies within nuclear states could lead to accidental or inadvertent nuclear launch.32 32 Gavin, ‘The Ivory Tower-Policy Gap’. View all notes As Frank Gavin writes in his review of the optimism/pessimism debate, ‘The real problem, however, is that Sagan plays small ball in his debate with Waltz, conceding the big issues. Why not challenge Waltz on his core arguments about deterrence and stability?’33 33 Ibid., 597. View all notes Rather than repeat the substantial efforts of previous pessimists, therefore, I will take up Gavin’s challenge and focus on three big issues. In particular, this section maintains that proliferation optimists: present an oversimplified version of nuclear deterrence theory, follow a line of argumentation that contains an internal logical contradiction, and do not address the concerns of US foreign policymakers. First and foremost, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified view of nuclear deterrence theory. Optimists argue that since the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear war would mean national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever choose to start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for rationality are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own survival and the survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts and policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully rational.34 34 For more, see Robert Litwak, Outlier States: American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 2012). View all notes Yet, these debates overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists, leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that nuclear proliferation contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of MAD among rational states.35 35 Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information’, American Political Science Review 82/1 (1988), 155–78; Robert Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’, American Political Science Review 83/2 (1989), 503–19. View all notes Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping MAD.36 36 Charles Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton UP 1990). View all notes Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand that some risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to function. To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.37 37 Brodie, The Absolute Weapon. View all notes After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.38 38 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge UP 1990). View all notes And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.39 39 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP Press 1966). View all notes He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.40 40 Ibid. View all notes They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis, as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a ‘competition in risk taking’.41 41 Ibid. View all notes This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been 20 high stakes nuclear crises in which ‘rational’ states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war.42 42 Matthew Kroenig, ‘Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve’, International Organization 67/1 (2013) 141–71. View all notes By asking whether states can be deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hizballah, the US presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to dismiss it out of hand. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons might be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as placing nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to low-level commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating.43 43 See for example, Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New York: Greenwood Press 1978). View all notes Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader would rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with 5,000. Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and are, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.44 44 Kroenig, ‘Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve.’ View all notes Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context, any sane leader would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear war.45 45 Klaus Knorr Limited Strategic War (New York: Praeger 1962); Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’, 503–19. View all notes For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear strike on a US military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear war could be a rational strategic move under certain circumstances, it then follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. To be sure, some strategic thinkers, including Henry Kissinger, advocated limited nuclear war as a viable strategy only to recant the position later due to fears of uncontrollable escalation. Yet, this does not change the fact that leading nuclear deterrence theorists maintain that limited nuclear war is possible among rational leaders in a MAD world.46 46 Powell, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation’. View all notes In sum, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified conception of nuclear deterrence theory. Leading academic deterrence theorists maintain that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear use in games of nuclear brinkmanship and through the exercise of limited nuclear options even among rational leaders in a situation of MAD. Indeed, they understand that a risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for nuclear deterrence to function, which leads us to our next point. The second weakness in the proliferation optimist argument is that it rests on an internal logical contradiction. This might come as a surprise to some, given that optimists are sometimes portrayed as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale conventional wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons will result in a catastrophic nuclear war. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that nuclear weapons will never be used. This is true whether the risk of nuclear war is exogenous or endogenous to the behavior of the actors involved; the probability of nuclear war simply cannot be both zero and nonzero. In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons raises the risk of nuclear war and, in so doing, deters large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international stability. But, despite the claims of many proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability. As was argued above, the most obvious way out of this dilemma is to concede that nuclear proliferation does indeed raise the risk of nuclear war. The third and final shortcoming of proliferation optimism is that it is not a useful guide for the formulation of US foreign policy. Optimists argue that US officials should not worry about the spread of nuclear weapons because new nuclear states can be deterred. Indeed, they argue that ‘more may be better’. In making these arguments, however, optimists confuse stability with the national interest. Optimists focus narrowly on whether the spread of nuclear weapons increases or decreases international stability, but policymakers must focus on how the spread of nuclear weapons affects a broad array of US interests. Even if the spread of nuclear weapons contributes to greater levels of international stability (and our above discussion suggests it might not) it does not necessarily follow that the spread of nuclear weapons is in the United States’, or any other state’s, interest. As we will discuss in much more detail in the following section, states have good reason to fear nuclear proliferation for many other reasons. US officials must worry about how the spread of nuclear weapons might: increase the risk of nuclear war, embolden the proliferant state, contribute to further proliferation, threaten the security of allies, put upward pressure on oil prices, constrain US military and political freedom of action, and detrimentally effect many other national goals. Moreover, increased international stability itself often runs counter to US interests. As I have argued elsewhere, one of the most consequential effects of nuclear proliferation is to constrain the freedom of action of the militarily most powerful states.47 47 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2010). View all notes Stability resulting from mutual nuclear deterrence means that more often than not, it will be the United States that will be deterred. If stability is obtained only because Washington is deterred from using force against an adversary in a situation where using force could advance national goals, stability harms, rather than advances, US national interests. US officials have publicly discussed the possibility of using force against Iran in various contingencies, but the United States would be less willing to use force against a nuclear-armed Iran. Optimists might counter that this point only reinforces their argument about proliferation leading to stability. Indeed, they are correct that proliferation would likely induce caution in US leaders. This point does not in any way undermine, however, the above critiques. Nuclear proliferation that constrains the United States would necessarily be accompanied by an increased risk of nuclear war. In addition, and more germane to this section, optimists are wrong to conclude that the United States should not worry about the spread of nuclear weapons because it contributes to stability. Rather, the United States has good reason to oppose nuclear proliferation for precisely this reason. In short, the optimists have brought an important perspective to the nonproliferation debate. Their arguments are provocative and they raise the bar for those who wish to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem. Nevertheless, their counterintuitive arguments are plagued by an under appreciation of the nuances of nuclear deterrence theory, a glaring logical contradiction, and a failure to address the concerns of US policymakers. Proliferation optimism, therefore, falls well short of a coherent intellectual framework and it cannot wish away the enormous security challenges posed by the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons. These myriad threats will be considered in the next section. Why Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 48 Steven Weber, ‘The End of the Business Cycle?’, Foreign Affairs 76/4 (July/Aug. 1997), 65–82. View all notes This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 49 Thomas Schelling, ‘Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack’, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Paper 1958). View all notes If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 50 Knorr, Limited Strategic War. View all notes This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 51 Of course there is no guarantee that Washington would have used nuclear weapons as planned in the event of actual conflict. It should be noted that US nuclear threats were intended not only to deter the Soviet Union, but also to reassure NATO partners and dissuade them from seeking independent nuclear forces. View all notes As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 52 Schelling, Arms and Influence. View all notes They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 53 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1993). View all notes When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

#### Extinction outweighs – it’s a distinct state of being

Burke et al., Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, ‘16

(Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

#### Militarism not an overarching structure – can’t be reduced to a single root cause

Bacevich, George McGovern fellow at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, ‘13

(Andrew J., *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, pg. 205-212)

There is, wrote H. L. Mencken, “always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”1 Mencken’s aphorism applies in spades to the subject of this account. To imagine that there exists a simple antidote **to the “military metaphysic**” to which the people and government of the United States have fallen prey is to misconstrue the problem. As the foregoing chapters make plain, the origins of America’s present-day infatuation with military power are **anything but simple**. American militarism is not the invention of a cabal nursing fantasies of global empire and manipulating an unsuspecting people frightened by the events of 9/11. Further, it is counterproductive to think in these terms— to assign culpability to a particular president or administration and to imagine that throwing the bums out will put things right. Yet neither does the present-day status of the United States as sole superpower reveal an essential truth, whether positive or negative, about the American project. Enthusiasts (mostly on the right) who interpret America’s possession of unrivaled and unprecedented armed might as proof that the United States enjoys the mandate of heaven are deluded. But so too are those (mostly on the left) who see in the far-flung doings of today’s U.S. military establishment substantiation of Major General Smedley Butler’s old chestnut that “war is just a racket” **and the American soldier “a gangster for capitalism”** sent abroad to do the bidding of Big Business or Big Oil.2 **Neither the will of God nor the venality of Wall Street suffices to explain how the United States managed to become stuck in World War IV.** Rather, the new American militarism is a little like pollution—the perhaps unintended, but foreseeable by-product of prior choices and decisions made without taking fully into account the full range of costs likely to be incurred.

In making the industrial revolution, the captains of American enterprise did not consciously set out to foul the environment, but as they harnessed the waters, crisscrossed the nation with rails, and built their mills and refineries, negative consequences ensued. Lakes and rivers became choked with refuse, the soil contaminated, and the air in American cities filthy.

By the time that the industrial age approached its zenith in the middle of the twentieth century, most Americans had come to take this for granted; a degraded environment seemed the price you had to pay in exchange for material abundance and by extension for freedom and opportunity. Americans might not like pollution, but there seemed to be no choice except to put up with it.

To appreciate that this was, in fact, not the case, Americans needed a different consciousness. This is where the environmental movement, beginning more or less in the 1960s, made its essential contribution. Environmentalists enabled Americans to see the natural world and their relationship to that world in a different light. They argued that the obvious deterioration in the environment was unacceptable and not at all inevitable. Alternatives did exist. Different policies and practices could stanch and even reverse the damage.

Purists in that movement insisted upon the primacy of environmental needs, everywhere and in all cases. Theirs was (and is) a principled position deserving to be heard. To act on their recommendations, however, would likely mean shutting down the economy, an impractical and politically infeasible course of action.

Pragmatists advanced a different argument. They suggested that it was possible to negotiate a compromise between economic needs and environmental imperatives. This compromise might oblige Americans to curtail certain bad habits, but it did not require changing the fundamentals of how they lived their lives. Americans could keep their cars and continue their love affair with consumption; but at the same time they could also have cleaner air and cleaner water. Implementing this compromise has produced an outcome that environmental radicals (and on the other side, believers in laissez-faire capitalism) today find unsatisfactory. In practice, it turns out, once begun negotiations never end. Bargaining is continuous, contentious, and deeply politicized. Participants in the process seldom come away with everything they want. Settling for half a loaf when you covet the whole is inevitably frustrating. But the results are self-evident. Environmental conditions in the United States today are palpably better than they were a half century ago. Pollution has not been vanquished, but it has become more manageable. Furthermore, the nation has achieved those improvements without imposing on citizens undue burdens and without preventing its entrepreneurs from innovating, creating, and turning a profit.

Restoring a semblance of balance and good sense to the way that Americans think about military power will require a similarly pragmatic approach. Undoing all of the negative effects that result from having been seduced by war may **lie beyond reach**, but Americans can at least make them more manageable and thereby salvage their democracy. In explaining the origins of the new American militarism, this account has not sought to assign or to impute blame. None of the protagonists in this story sat down after Vietnam and consciously plotted to propagate perverse attitudes toward military power any more than Andrew Carnegie or John D. Rockefeller plotted to despoil the nineteenth-century American landscape. The clamor after Vietnam to rebuild the American arsenal and to restore American self-confidence, the celebration of soldierly values, the search for ways to make force more usable: all of these came about because groups of Americans thought that they glimpsed in the realm of military affairs the solution to vexing problems. The soldiers who sought to rehabilitate their profession, the intellectuals who feared that America might share the fate of Weimar, the strategists wrestling with the implications of nuclear weapons, the conservative Christians appalled by the apparent collapse of traditional morality: none of these acted out of motives that were inherently dishonorable. To the extent that we may find fault with the results of their efforts, that fault is more appropriately attributable to **human fallibility than to malicious intent**. And yet **in the end it is** not motive that matters but outcome. Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power, the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so today “global power projection”—a phrase whose sharp edges we have worn down through casual use, but which implies military activism without apparent limit—has become standard practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do.

Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way.

Of course, **dissenting views already exist.** A rich tradition of American pacifism abhors the resort to violence as always and in every case wrong. Advocates of disarmament argue that by their very existence weapons are an incitement to violence. In the former camp, there can never be a justification for war. In the latter camp, **the shortest road to peace begins with the beating of swords into ploughshares**. These are principled views that deserve a hearing, more so today than ever. By discomfiting the majority, advocates of such views serve the common good. But to make full-fledged pacifism or comprehensive disarmament the basis for policy in an intrinsically disordered world would be to open the United States to grave danger.

#### Acting to change the world generates meaning – their deterministic account of ressentiment leads to social Darwinism that causes their impacts

Michael Ure 12 – date inferred, political and social theory prof at Monash University, Resentment/Ressentiment, <http://www.academia.edu/2434176/Resentment_Ressentiment>

Nietzsche's slave revolt against the aristocratic order of rank larger/ fits the bill of socio-political resentment: it primarily derives from impotent distress about what its agents claim are global or systematic injustices directed at their social group, rather than individual distress over agent specific acts of malice. **Nietzsche** simply **clouds the issue when he explains** this socio-political **resentment solely in terms of** ressentiment against life, which he conceives as a symptom of physiological degeneracy. If we follow Nietzsche we must agree in effect that slave protest against aristocratic privilege does not derive from socio-political resentment, but from ressentiment against the fundamental conditions of life, or what we might call ontological ressentiment. As an aristocratic radical he assumes that a systematically uneven distribution of power, goods and opportunities can be just as long as it reflects a natural hierarchy of excellence. He also seems to assume that pagan antiquities' noble-slave divide properly reflected a natural order of rank between flourishing (ascending) and degenerate (descending) types. He applauds the classical world's unequal distribution of power and goods on the grounds that it facilitated the flourishing of the highest human types. Since Nietzsche claims the biologically impotent can never achieve personal excellence or cultural greatness he argues that their attempts to morally proscribe aggressive, combative drives and to equalize opportunities for all only serve to eliminate the necessary conditions of existence for the highest human types. Nietzsche believes, then, that we should reverse the slave revolt, not merely in order to a restore aristocratic privilege, but because to do so is to protect life itself from degeneration. Nietzsche misconceives socio-political resentment of unjust aristocratic privilege with ressentiment or an attack on the fundamental conditions of existence. Nietzsche wants to convince us that in attacking the aristocratic order of rank these 'slaves' are attacking 'life' or 'existence'. Slaves are the enemies of 'life', not aristocratic privilege. He transforms the political drama of class conflict and resentment into an apocalyptic conflict **between** the forces of life affirmation and the forces of life-denial or ressentiment.

If we suspend Nietzsche's aristocratic prejudice, underpinned by the neo-Darwinian spectre of biological degeneracy, we might argue instead that the unequal distribution of power, goods and opportunities imposes rather than expresses an order of rank. If we grant this point, we can then conceive 'slave' revolt as legitimate socio-political resentment against political and material inequities, a protest that should aim to establish conditions that enable the socially and political disadvantaged group the same opportunities to maximise their capabilities. "What Nietzsche ignores" as Solomon explains "partly because of his own sense of biological determinism ... is the legitimacy of the felt need to change the world. The sentiment of resentment may often be a legitimate sense of oppression. It is not the voice of mediocrity or incompetence but the passion for justice denied".65

What then of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment? If his account of the master-slave dynamic is better understood primarily as a case of socio-political resentment, does the concept of ressentiment have any moral or political significance? Clearly in the modern speculative philosophical tradition what I am calling ontological ressentiment has taken root as a meaningful concept. However, while we grant ressentiment status as a peculiar, perhaps even uniquely modern psychological pathology, it remains an open question whether, as Nietzsche assumed, it can help interpret or explain moral or political phenomena.66

#### Alts to cap fail – just creates a different version of squo failures

Hovenkamp, James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School, ‘18

(Herbert, “Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?” Faculty Scholarship at

Penn Law. 1964)

As a movement, antitrust often succeeds at capturing political attention and engaging at least some voters, but it fails at making effective or even coherent policy. The result is goals that are unmeasurable and fundamentally inconsistent, although with their contradictions rarely exposed. Among the most problematic contradictions is the one between small business protection and consumer welfare. In a nutshell, consumers benefit from low prices, high output, and high quality and variety of products and services. But when a firm or a technology is able to offer these things they invariably injure rivals, typically those who are smaller or heavily invested in older technologies. Although movement antitrust rhetoric is often opaque about specifics, its general effect is invariably to encourage higher prices or reduced output or innovation, mainly for the protection of small business or those whose technology or other investments have become obsolete. Indeed, that has been a predominant feature of movement antitrust ever since the Sherman Act was passed, and it remains a prominent feature of movement antitrust today. Indeed, some spokespersons for movement antitrust write, as Louis Brandeis did, as if low prices are the evil that antitrust law should be combatting.17

Nevertheless, mantras such as “industrial concentration” or “big business” have great political force. These terms provide almost nothing in the way of administrable rules while yet evoking an image of something big, bad, and powerful that government must bring under control. For example, here is the plank of the 2016 Democratic Party’s platform on antitrust:

Large corporations have concentrated their control over markets to a greater degree than Americans have seen in decades—further evidence that the deck is stacked for those at the top. Democrats will take steps to stop corporate concentration in any industry where it is unfairly limiting competition. We will make competition policy and antitrust stronger and more responsive to our economy today, enhance the antitrust enforcement arms of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and encourage other agencies to police anti-competitive practices in their areas of jurisdiction.

We support the historic purpose of the antitrust laws to protect competition and prevent excessively consolidated economic and political power, which can be corrosive to a healthy democracy. We support reinvigorating DOJ and FTC enforcement of antitrust laws to prevent abusive behavior by dominant companies, and protecting the public interest against abusive, discriminatory, and unfair methods of commerce. We support President Obama’s recent Executive Order, directing all agencies to identify specific actions they can take in their areas of jurisdiction to detect anticompetitive practices—such as tying arrangements, price fixing, and exclusionary conduct—and to refer practices that appear to violate federal antitrust law to the DOJ and FTC.18

The antitrust plank never references low consumer prices, or anything having to do with product quality. That is not because Democrats are not interested in low consumer prices.19 Rather, they apparently believe that antitrust has little to do with it. The references to prices occur in other sections of the platform, devoted to such subjects as health and safety and the high price of pharmaceutical drugs. Those sections make no reference to antitrust law.20 The only references to “consumers” occur in planks pertaining to unionization, affordable housing, Wall Street, banks and Dodd-Frank, and clean energy.21 So according to the platform, while legal policy generally is concerned with high consumer prices, antitrust policy apparently is not. By contrast, the 2016 Republican platform never references antitrust, although it does contain a plank promoting a “competitive America,” but focused entirely on lowering tax rates.22

The antitrust plank in the 2016 Democrat platform is actually one of the most detailed to appear in any platform by a major political party.23 The catchphrases that it uses, however—“corporate concentration,” “unfairly limiting competition,” or “abusive behavior by dominant companies”—can mean practically anything depending on assumptions. The platform is peppered with references to “fair” or “fairness,” including the antitrust plank, but with no reference point indicating how fairness should be assessed. Is it “fair” that consumers be asked to pay high prices in order to accommodate the shortcomings of some businesses; or conversely, is it “fair” that small businesses suffer simply because they are not able to compete with larger firms on price or quality; or is it “fair” that firms heavily invested in old brick-andmortar distribution lose out to more technologically entrepreneurial firms? “Fairness” as an antitrust concern means nothing without a reference point or set of measurement tools.

As for specific practices, the antitrust plank in the Democrat platform singles out “tying arrangements, price fixing, and exclusionary conduct,” saying nothing about mergers, other vertical restraints, or anticompetitive patent practices. In fact, the platform never mentions patents, although it makes frequent references to innovation, largely in the context of proposed government intervention to stimulate production24 or to finance research and development and educate people for more technically demanding jobs.25 Of the three anticompetitive practices that it singles out, “price fixing” is completely uncontroversial and has always been a central focus of nearly every articulation of antitrust policy, left, center, and right—including in Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox. 26 The term “exclusionary conduct” is so vague that it is meaningless. Both socially harmful and socially beneficial conduct can be “exclusionary.” The inclusion of “tying arrangements” is mystifying. Tying is ubiquitous in modern economies and is an essential characteristic of networks and technology.27 Further, the vast majority of it is procompetitive because it increases output without excluding anyone. Finally, the number of antitrust tying cases is small in comparison with merger cases, which make up a large portion of antitrust enforcement activity. A major party platform that identifies “tying arrangements” but not “mergers” as a fundamental concern requires an explanation. Most importantly, it seems to miss the whole point of competitive markets, which is to produce a high output of quality, competitively priced goods.

At least in part, the Democratic Party platform reflects the reappearance of movement antitrust. While it is hardly the only expression, and certainly not the most extreme, it represents a troublesome development—namely, the idea that America needs higher prices in order to give smaller firms a fair chance. The platform also gives a reader the strong impression that its slogans were selected in order to achieve maximum political traction with the illiterati, and perhaps that is all that can be expected of a political platform. In the process, however, it does antitrust policy a great disservice by making its legitimate targets almost impossible to define and not providing ammunition for attacking them when they are defined. Its supporters generally disparage the use of economics, sometimes suggesting that antitrust policy should be governed by political theory instead.28 Exactly how political theory gets one to specific antitrust rules is not completely clear, but it involves excluding the opinions of antitrust experts concerning the public’s interest.29

Movement antitrust argues variously for abandoning the measurement of competition by reference to output and price,30 or even abandoning consumer welfare as an antitrust proscription altogether.31 It accuses retailers such as Amazon of engaging in “predatory pricing” without providing a coherent definition of the practice.32 It never explains how a nonmanufacturing retailer such as Amazon could ever recover its investment in belowcost pricing by later raising prices, and even disputes that raising prices to higher levels ever needs to be a part of the strategy, thus indicating that it is confusing predation with investment.33 Charging low but profitable prices indefinitely is not unlawful “predatory pricing”‘ nor is forcing suppliers to price competitively.

The movement antitrust attack on “consumer welfare” reflects both a misunderstanding of that term, and an exaggeration of its influence on recent antitrust jurisprudence. This point is critical because much of movement antitrust blames the consumer welfare principle for the current state of antitrust law. Consumer welfare as it is properly used today refers to the welfare of consumers as consumers, pure and simple.34 Speaking objectively, consumer welfare is improved by high output and low prices, as well as high quality. Under this definition the welfare of producers, competitors, or anyone other than consumers who might be affected by a practice is ignored. In addition to its substantive advantages, this principle has a powerful administrative advantage: it does not require courts to compute welfare “tradeoffs,” because there is nothing to trade off.35

In sharp contrast, Robert Bork very famously used the term “consumer welfare” when he was really referring to the combined welfare of both producers and consumers.36 He observed that an economic tradeoff occurs when a supplier practice causes monopolistic increases in consumer prices but also reduces the supplier’s costs.37 Most peculiarly, for Bork the word “consumer” referred to suppliers as well as customers.38 For Bork, a practice that generated one hundred dollars in seller profits but buyer losses of sixty dollars would be counted as a net improvement of “consumer welfare.” Bork also believed, however, that actual computation of welfare tradeoffs in individual cases would be too difficult. Further, an attempt to do so would overlook important efficiencies. Rather, efficiencies should be presumed, even when the challenged practice creates market power.39 That presumption of efficiency without proof is one of the most controversial aspects of Bork’s approach to the welfare question.

These two understandings of consumer welfare have produced a troublesome ambiguity in antitrust law ever since. For example, some of those who write in movement antitrust today attribute the consumer welfare principle to Bork,40 and as a result blame it for higher prices that accrue to producers. But the important thing is that high producer profits for Bork was part of the consumer welfare that antitrust law should produce.

This ambiguity about definition has also affected Supreme Court usage of “consumer welfare.” The Supreme Court has never categorically embraced any particular definition of consumer welfare, even though it has used the term several times. Six majority opinions speak of consumer welfare. Two were quotations from Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, suggesting that the Court was either speaking of producer welfare as well, or else that it did not appreciate the difference between Bork’s definition and true consumer welfare.41 Plaintiffs won both cases, however, and the holdings are consistent with true consumer welfare. Indeed, in one of them, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme Court held that end-use consumers had standing to pursue price fixing, making it an important consumer welfare decision.42

Of the remaining four uses, two involved predatory pricing cases observing that consumer welfare would be enhanced by a period of below-cost pricing that was not followed by recoupment of losses through subsequent higher prices.43 That would very likely be true. An unsuccessful attempt at predatory pricing would result in lower consumer prices temporarily, but no subsequent period of high prices. The final uses of consumer welfare are related to the Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. decision holding that some instances of resale price maintenance may promote consumer welfare. The first was Leegin itself44 and the second was Ohio v. American Express Co., making essentially the same observation.45 That could also be true under either definition of consumer welfare.

Four additional usages of the term are in dissents.46 Finally, the term appeared in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in the Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde tying case. Justice Brennan observed that some ties could impair horizontal competition, injuring consumer welfare.47 A few other cases never use the phrase “consumer welfare” but do speak more generally about benefits to consumers.48 None of these Supreme Court decisions distinguish the Bork definition of consumer welfare from the true consumer welfare position. Beyond the Supreme Court, the strongest case for application of a consumer welfare principle is in merger law under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which embrace a consumer welfare principle to the extent that they tie merger policy to the effect on output and consumer prices.49

One of the most disturbing things about movement antitrust is its indifference or even disparagement of low consumer prices. Without citing any evidence, some of its protagonists proclaim that most Americans are not concerned with high prices that might result from monopoly, but rather with “loss of their properties, hence their independence, even their dignity.”50 They recommend harsh rules against vertical integration without ever stating a test, other than a very general suggestion that vertical integration leads to leveraging and foreclosure.51 They call for a return to the merger enforcement standards expressed in the 1968 Merger Guidelines—for example, blocking any merger between a firm with fifteen percent of a market and any other firm whose market share is one percent or more. The relevance of these numbers is not apparent, other than their suggestion that firms are

currently too big.52

Clearly, high prices are not the target. The movement’s proponents denigrate the importance of prices to merger analysis—for example, objecting to the fact that, while the 1968 Merger Guidelines were not particularly focused on consumer prices, guidelines issued in the 1980s and after were. Indeed, low prices appear to be the enemy that antitrust must combat.53 Movement protagonists argue in favor of resale price maintenance, not in order to promote lower cost distribution, but rather to protect less efficient retailers’ higher margins from predatory pricing—without any evidence of a type of predatory pricing that resale price maintenance could combat.54 They enthusiastically embrace Louis Brandeis’s repeated arguments that “price-cutting” is in fact “the most potent weapon of monopoly—a means of killing the small rival.”55 Much of the resale price maintenance that Brandeis supported occurred at the behest of dealer cartels who forced suppliers to use resale price maintenance as a way of disciplining price cutters.56

Certainly, big business can cause harm to the lives of Americans in other ways than through competitive pricing. But these ways need to be articulated, supported by evidence, and then sorted into those things that are conceivably within the domain of antitrust and those that are not. Promiscuous application of the antitrust laws so as to make big firms smaller and prices higher could cause irreparable harm, not only to consumers, but to the entire economy.

#### Rejecting cap causes violent transition wars that dooms any chance of solvency

#### Wainer and Bienenfeld 19 – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, <https://newpol.org/issue_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/>)

Governors control the National Guard and state police. Local governments control local police forces, although the Constitution allows states full discretion to limit the autonomy of localities. While the president may federalize the guard for a period of time, **it is easy to imagine guard generals refusing to obey presidential authority when asked to enforce decisions the courts have ruled unconstitutional**. Of course a president can send the army into states, thus violating the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but it is similarly easy to envision generals refusing to execute orders on solid constitutional grounds, or the officer corps dividing amongst itself, in that scenario. In short **there would be no way** of overcoming state recalcitrance **to implement socialist legislation without destroying the legitimacy of the constitutional order.**

In fact, not only can **state authorities** resist**, they can also repress**. Partial socialist victories in the electoral arena would inevitably yield a **fractured state,** with critical parts still in the hands of pro-capitalist officials. The latter would be constitutionally authorized to arrest and terrorize mass movement activists who threaten their rule. They have, after all, done so numerous times in U.S. history. Even today, federal and state authorities are far more likely to arrest someone for the crime of being an immigrant or person of color than for marching with an armed fascist gang threatening the annihilation of the Jews. **Mass movements that are not prepared to physically confront and defeat armed authorities would stand little chance.**

Bureaucracy, the Regulatory Process, and Unelected Authority

While the legislative and executive branches make law and the judicial branch reviews laws, unelected regulatory bodies determine how they are actually interpreted and implemented. Currently, these bodies are staffed by skilled bureaucrats through a combination of patronage, political favoritism, and civil service promotion. Regulatory agencies are typically staffed by and managed by the industries they are designed to regulate. Even lower-level bureaucratic posts often enable employees to audition for far more lucrative private-sector employment. This creates enormous incentives to defer to corporate prerogative, even if the elected authorities have a different agenda. And these regulatory agencies decide what the law means in day-to-day situations that lawmakers can never predict when writing bills.

Bureaucratic and regulatory agencies govern at the local, state, and federal levels. They set zoning policies that largely determine whether housing is affordable and safe for working-class habitation. Their rules indirectly affect how much of their lives working people spend commuting to and from work because where tall buildings are built often determines which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic. As with regulatory agencies, building departments are typically instruments of real estate developers, even if they do protect occupants’ safety to some extent. Unelected bodies, such as public authorities in New York and New Jersey, typically control public transportation and critical infrastructure, and an army of bureaucrats runs the education systems all over the United States. All of these bureaucratic agencies are susceptible to intense pressure from highly paid lobbyists. Conditions of housing, transportation, public health, and education are some of the most powerful forces shaping workers’ daily lives, and it is difficult to imagine how working people would maintain confidence in and enthusiasm for a workers’ government that could not demonstrably improve those aspects of their lives. It is also difficult to see how a government could make significant headway in those areas without breaking apart the relevant bureaucracies and busting up the private-sector lobbying firms that influence them. In short, the very precondition for sustained radical electoral success would require the demolition of most regulatory organizations and their replacement with democratic and accountable bodies.

Unelected bureaucracy also reigns in the area of foreign policy. While major decisions such as going to or avoiding war, or negotiating trade agreements, are in the hands of elected officials, many of the day-to-day details of foreign relations are decided and implemented by career officials who are similarly subjected to substantial corporate lobbying and use foreign service careers as springboards into highly paid private-sector employment. The State Department routinely approves international trade licenses, contacts foreign bureaucrats on behalf of U.S. firms, and utilizes personal relationships with international counterparts to smooth those processes. In a world in which several major capitalist states still rule and the U.S. state is fractured, these bureaucrats could become key links between global and domestic counter-revolution.

While bureaucracy takes different forms in different countries, career civil servants staff the state apparatus in most capitalist states today. They tend to be ideologically committed to the survival of the state. Their career ambitions also depend on the patronage of higher ups in each department and alliances with private capitalists who hold the key to their promotion both inside and outside the public sector.

Can bureaucracy be subordinated to a workers’ government? Yes. In fact the soviet state had no choice but to rely on sectors of the tsarist bureaucracy both to win the civil war and for government administration in the 1920s. In a scenario in which the capitalist class has been fully defeated, disempowered bureaucrats might well decide, one by one, that cooperation with the new workers’ regime represents the only hope for maintaining their careers. However, the “democratic,” or, more accurately, the electoral, road to socialism leads inevitably along a different path. It does not deliver a sudden, decisive defeat to the state or to the ruling class. Quite the contrary, it leads to what might be termed “dual power,” in which socialists rule over substantial sectors of the government but capitalist politicians dominate others and much of the capitalist state bureaucracy remains intact. The police, fearing that their careers are in jeopardy, would likely continue to repress mass movements and fight at all costs to preserve their positions. These institutions of the capitalist state would also have powerful allies in the judiciary, not to mention support from capitalists around the world. Under that scenario it is highly unlikely that the administrative bureaucracies would place themselves at the service of workers’ regimes who have far less to offer them and from whom they have far less to fear.

Throughout U.S. history the labor movement and other **radical reform movements have had to contend with ferocious and violent counterattacks**. After World War I, socialists, anarchists, and labor activists of various stripes faced intense state repression. The **survival o**f U.S. **capitalism was not in question** at this time. **Yet, the federal government responded with mass arrests**, deportations, frame-ups, **and violence.** After World War II, federal and state governments effectively repressed the radical wings of the labor movement with witch hunts and blacklists, while tolerating rampant racist violence. It is important to note that **the Communist Party** **not only**, at this point, **could not have threatened revolution, its orientation was heavily electoral**. But the mere prospect of a more militant labor movement and a radical electoral alternative was something both Democrats and Republicans were determined to repress. In the 1960s the FBI’s Cointelpro program targeted movement activists and even murdered Black Panther leader Fred Hampton.

A workers movement in the United States must prepare for severe state repression or it will succumb to it. At times this may involve operating clandestinely. It may also require active self-defense against legal authorities or fascist paramilitaries. Most importantly, preparation means educating a generation of socialist and labor activists about how and why the state protects capitalist profitability both through its own constitutional mechanisms and often with repressive measures that violate its own legality.

#### Neoclassical competition is key to drive down costs in space exploration – spurs innovation

Weinzierl and Sarang ’21 - Joseph And Jacqueline Elbling Professor Of Business Administration, Chair, Mba Required Curriculum, Business, Government And The International Economy, Research Associate at HBS | MIT Space Exploration Intitiative

Harvard Business Review, 2-12-2021, "The Commercial Space Age Is Here," <https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here>

There’s no shortage of hype surrounding the commercial space industry. But while tech leaders promise us moon bases and settlements on Mars, the space economy has thus far remained distinctly local — at least in a cosmic sense. Last year, however, we crossed an important threshold: For the first time in human history, humans accessed space via a vehicle built and owned not by any government, but by a private corporation with its sights set on affordable space settlement. It was the first significant step towards building an economy both in space and for space. The implications — for business, policy, and society at large — are hard to overstate.

In 2019, [95%](https://brycetech.com/reports) of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is, goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure, earth observation capabilities, national security satellites, and more. This economy is booming, and though [research shows](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/716037-PDF-ENG) that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource, [projections for its future](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/720027-PDF-ENG) are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market, and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services.

In contrast, the space-for-space economy — that is, goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots — has struggled to get off the ground. As far back as the 1970s, [research](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19780004167) commissioned by NASA predicted the rise of a space-based economy that would supply the demands of hundreds, thousands, even millions of humans living in space, dwarfing the space-for-earth economy (and, eventually, the entire terrestrial economy as well). The realization of such a vision would change how all of us do business, live our lives, and govern our societies — but to date, we’ve never even had more than [13 people](https://www.space.com/6503-population-space-historic-high-13.html) in space at one time, leaving that dream as little more than science fiction.

Today, however, there is reason to think that we may finally be reaching the first stages of a true space-for-space economy. SpaceX’s [recent achievements](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-spacex-crew-1-astronauts-headed-to-international-space-station/) (in cooperation with NASA), as well as upcoming efforts by [Boeing](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/boeing-s-starliner-makes-progress-ahead-of-flight-test-with-astronauts), [Blue Origin](https://www.blueorigin.com/news/nasa-selects-blue-origin-national-team-to-return-humans-to-the-moon), and [Virgin Galactic](https://spacenews.com/virgin-galactic-prepares-to-transition-to-operations) to put people in space sustainably and at scale, mark the opening of a new chapter of spaceflight led by private firms. These firms have both the intention and capability to bring private citizens to space as passengers, tourists, and — eventually — settlers, opening the door for businesses to start meeting the demand those people create over the next several decades with an array of space-for-space goods and services.

Welcome to the (Commercial) Space Age

In our [recent research](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/jep.32.2.173_Space,%20the%20Final%20Economic%20Frontier_413bf24d-42e6-4cea-8cc5-a0d2f6fc6a70.pdf), we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth.

In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised [settlement on Mars](https://www.spacex.com/media/making_life_multiplanetary_transcript_2017.pdf).

Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry.

This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing.

[Made In Space, Inc.](https://madeinspace.us/capabilities-and-technology/archinaut/) has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a [$74 million contract](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-funds-demo-of-3d-printed-spacecraft-parts-made-assembled-in-orbit) to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive.

Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently [announced](https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22250327/space-tourists-axiom-private-crew-iss-price) that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also [awarded](https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-axiom-space-to-build-commercial-space-station-module/) a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it).

This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a [$142 million contract](https://www.builtincolorado.com/2020/02/03/maxar-technologies-142m-nasa-contract) from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools.

#### A slew of black swans make extinction inevitable. Moral hedging necessitates space habituation

Kovic, 18 – co-founder and president of the thinktank [ZIPAR](https://kovic.ch/zipar/), the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research. He is also co-founder and CEO of the consulting firm [ars cognitionis](https://kovic.ch/consulting-ars-cognitionis/),. He has a PhD in political communication, University of Zurich

Marko Kovic, “Why space colonization is so important,” Medium. November 10, 2018. <https://medium.com/@marko_kovic/space-colonization-why-nothing-else-matters-a877723f77d4>

Space or bust: Why we must reach for the stars

Why should we pursue space colonization in the first place? Don’t we have more pressing problems today, on Earth?

Yes, we do have many problems on Earth today, and we should try to solve them. But space colonization is just that: A strategy for dealing with certain problems. An the problems that space colonization would be dealing with are, arguably, among the greatest problems of them all: Existential risks; risks that might lead to the extinction of humankind [1]. Currently, all of our proverbial existential eggs are in the same basket. If a natural existential risk strikes (for example, a large asteroid colliding with Earth) or if a man-made existential risk results in a catastrophic outcome (for example, runaway global warming [2, 3]), all of humankind is at risk because humankind is currently limited to planet Earth. If, however, there are self-sustainable human habitats beyond Earth, then the probability of an irreversibly catastrophic outcome for all of humankind is drastically reduced.

Investing in space colonization today could therefore have immense future benefits. Using resources today in order to make space colonization possible in the medium-term future is not a waste, but a very profitable investment. If humankind stays limited to Earth and if we go extinct as a consequence of doing so, then we will all the billions of life years and billions of humans who might have come to exist — and who would have experienced happiness and contributed to humankind’s continued epistemic and moral progress.

## 2NC

### T

### Case

#### Independently, not everyone will have the same angry reaction towards life which disproves the ressentiment theory

Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science – Johns Hopkins University, ‘14

(William E., “Freedom, Teleodynamism, Creativity,” Foucault Studies, No. 17, pp. 60-75, April)

The task now is to overcome existential resentment of the very idea of modes of dissonance that set conditions of possibility for the modest element of creativity you embrace, To do that, in turn, involves overcoming hubristic modes of explanation and sovereignty. Belief and attachment to this world certainly do not mean that you embrace every event that occurs, for you must resist some and fight radically against others. It means that you seek to become worthy of the event by affirming a world in which events punctuate history. This, to me, is where Deleuze and Nietzsche meet, amidst the significant differences between them. If you prize the gift and risk in the element of creativity, if you conclude that it is worth affirming as part of life amidst the grave risks it brings, if you admit that we are often overmatched by nonhuman forcefields, then you may seek to overcome the existential resentment which is commonly formulated today as concern over the “lack” of automatic belonging to nature, or to God, or to culture, or to history. You will also become wary of the very idea of definitive, dispositive argument as a consummate power of human being. A speculative element now enters thinking, an affirmative element enters existential attachment, and an experimental element infiltrates into political activism. All three are needed together, since, if any is absent, you may not have become worthy of the event. To affirm the creative element of freedom as gift and risk is to break with the demand to belong to the world automatically, or to be a bearer of the kind of judgment grounded in either a divine order or tight transcendental arguments. You will also admit that the density of language is important, but insufficient to creative thinking. Incompleteness, the insufficiency of argument and explanation, and time out of joint now lose their standing as mere lacks. They regain them as both dangers during the era of the Anthropocene and uncertain conditions of possibility for creativity in a cosmos that is open to an uncertain degree. To affirm belief in this world is thus to come to terms more positively with a world in which gaps, breaks, dissonances, events, and messy intersections appear. Attachment to this world now becomes tied to incompleteness, belief, vitality, intrusive events, danger and creativity. Incompleteness and time out of joint lose their standing as mere lacks or losses to grieve; they regain them as both dangerous and ambiguous conditions for the vitality of being. They even become valued resources to draw upon as we finally engage the age of the Anthropocene and realize that none of the historical options we have struggled over is up to the task before us. Again, periodic creativity definitely carries danger with it, particularly when it is attached to a vengeful or narrow spirituality. A new derivatives system, a new weapon, the rapid spread of a new disease, a new climate pattern, or a new vengeful social movement can be born out of it. There are no existential guarantees here. Many in the academy sense this. But they are then tempted to respond in the wrong way. They may seek to quarantine the creative process, reserving it to art alone, or to the will of God, or to impersonal markets. But such a widely distributed process is difficult to quarantine. And creativity is needed during the era of the Anthropocene. It is better to embrace it cautiously. Many, however, may still seek solace in promises of organic belonging, or existential fullness, or impersonal market rationality, or definitive modes of argument, or transcendent judgments, or the hubris of complete explanation, appealing to agendas that both put the squeeze on creativity and could recoil destructively upon life. It is not just the white working class that “clings to its religion and its guns”. And not all of them do that, anyway. Check out, for instance, the crevices in which some of your academic colleagues crouch.

#### Their theory is academic garbage

Levy and Thompson 13

Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories.

We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence.

It is not even clear whether **different kinds of organized warfare**—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures.

International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether **different kinds of interstate wars** can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011).

Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time

. As his detailed and informative graphs make clear, different forms of human violence began to decline at different times and proceeded at different rates.12 Many of the trends are not monotonic and sometimes point in different directions. The gradual decline in the frequency of great power war was interrupted in the first half of the twentieth century but then continued from 1950s to the present, while the frequency of civil wars began to increase significantly after 1960 before beginning an uneven decline by 1990 that included an uptick in the early 2000s. It is clear that great power wars and civil wars follow different trajectories,13 undercutting any claim that a single process could drive these different patterns (unless those processes are defined so generally as to lose their analytic utility).

#### Cap makes revolution terminally unsustainable – insurgents need to get back to work but capitalist counter-reaction is persistent and violent

**Wainer and Bienenfeld 19** – Kit Wainer is a member of the United Federation of Teachers and is active in the opposition caucus, the Movement of Rank and File Educators. Mel Bienenfeld is a longtime socialist activist and recently retired president of a higher-education teachers local union.

(Kate Griffiths, 7-21-2019, "Problems with an Electoral Road to Socialism in the United States," New Politics, https://newpol.org/issue\_post/problems-with-an-electoral-road-to-socialism-in-the-united-states/)

Could an Electoral Transition Succeed?

Hypothetically, yes. But to imagine **a successful socialist transition** that does not entail a decisive defeat of the capitalist state and repression of capitalist political institutions assumes implausible preconditions. First, because it is impossible to win all levers of governmental power in one election, we would have to imagine several wave elections over a multiyear period. Second, this would require mass working-class mobilizations involving large demonstrations and strikes that don’t ebb over multiple years. These would be necessary to maintain intense pressure on nonsocialist politicians and career bureaucrats and sustain electoral armies to reelect socialist (or at least working-class) majorities at the federal and state levels. Activists in these movements would have to be willing to continue to mobilize, despite the enormous sacrifices of time, energy, and attention to their personal lives, for a socialist cause that would yield few tangible benefits for the first several years.

The problem with these suppositions is that historically, working-class struggle is episodic but capitalist reaction is continuous. Ultimately, the electoral road—even one that combines electoral victories with mass strikes and protests—depends on a type of working-class mobilization that is wildly out of sync with the actual patterns of workers movements since the nineteenth century. Workers have been able to organize to win substantial gains from employers and the state in most of the world at one point or another. However, these struggles have always been episodic. They sometimes win tangible victories at the high point of mass struggle or in the aftermath. They often change cultural values as well. But then they inevitably recede. There are good reasons for this. First, under capitalism workers do not own the means of production. Rather they depend upon their ability to work for employers in order to pay their bills. Consequently, they cannot strike continuously. Second, although for socialists mass movements are exciting, for most participants that excitement is combined with enormous sacrifice. Workers who organize surrender precious hours after stressful work days. They have to forgo time with their children and often need to choose between attending meetings or rallies and working the second jobs they need to pay for their housing, health care, or children’s education. Understandably, when meaningful victory appears remote it is difficult to get people to become activists even at a minimal level. When a movement grows, the passion and possibility of success attract larger numbers. But eventually, commitment levels are difficult to maintain and the lure of normal lives chips away at the movement’s base.

Capitalist counter-reaction, by contrast, is persistent. Even if ruling classes suffer partial defeats and have to make temporary concessions, their struggle to maintain their dominance and expand their advantages proceeds. U.S. workers, for example, mobilized in multiple waves between the Civil War and the late twentieth century. Strikes and militant organizing crested in the late nineteenth century, again after World War I, again in the mid-1930s, and again after World War II. These waves yielded partial victories: legalization of unions, limits on the work day, and workplace safety legislation, to name a few. Yet employers’ counterattacks, particularly since the 1970s, have been persistent, frequently violent, and have whittled away most of those gains. The vast majority of workers today are not unionized. Consequently, they enjoy no real workplace protections. Bureaucratic regulatory agencies rarely protect workers, even if the laws say they should. And most workers need to work more than forty hours just to survive. Employers’ struggles are not episodic for very practical reasons. While workers’ struggle requires independent organization, demands personal sacrifice, and often runs counter to dominant ideological and cultural assumptions, capitalist and bureaucratic counter-reaction is relatively cost-free. Capitalists do not need to surrender family time in order to squeeze employees. They do it at work when they shape the pace of production and negotiate contracts. Government bureaucrats similarly give up no free time to assist employers. They are on the clock when they interpret and enforce regulatory regimes in line with a pro-business agenda. For business owners and state officials, anti-worker reaction is their day job. And they can keep doing it, day after day, year after year, regardless of their levels of enthusiasm.

## 1NR

### DA

#### More ev – the US and China are competing now, and only innovation solves

Carl Benedikt Frey, is Oxford Martin Citi Fellow and Future of Work Director at the Oxford Martin School at Oxford University and the author of The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation, and Michael Osborne is Professor of Machine Learning at the University of Oxford, a Fellow at the Oxford Martin School, and Co-Founder of Mind Foundry, 2020, China Won’t Win the Race for AI Dominance, Foreign Affairs

DYNAMISM VERSUS STABILITY

Artificial intelligence is not yet a mature technology, and continued progress will require radical innovation on multiple fronts. Breakthroughs will happen the way they usually do: through serendipity and recombination, as inventors and entrepreneurs interact and exchange ideas. China’s strong state and collectivist structure have significant advantages in swiftly building infrastructure or mounting a coherent response to a pandemic. But radical innovation is a different matter, and historically, the most innovative societies have always been those that allowed people to pursue controversial ideas. As the eminent economic historian Joel Mokyr has argued, that is why the Industrial Revolution happened in the West rather than in China in the first place.

China’s efforts to restrict the flow of ideas on the Internet and elsewhere are likely to hold back innovation. Since September 2019, China and Huawei have been proposing radical changes to the Internet infrastructure that underpins networks worldwide. If implemented, the changes would likely splinter the Internet and further reduce Chinese citizens’ exposure to new ideas from outside the country. The initiative underlines Beijing’s preference for maintaining the political status quo, even if that means slower innovation and less dynamism.

That said, the United States is not destined to win the race for supremacy in artificial intelligence. China could still change its trajectory, and new immigration restrictions imposed by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump could stifle innovation in the United States. Research shows that immigration has been a key driver of American innovation over the past 130 years. The Trump administration’s alleged plans to restrict H-1B visas is particularly worrying in this regard. But while Trump might hold on to power for another term, Xi Jinping could rule indefinitely.

Under Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has stepped up efforts to penetrate private-sector businesses and consolidate political power. A surveillance state with a censored Internet, together with a social credit system that promotes conformity and obedience, seems unlikely to foster creativity: innovation is about breaking the rules, not abiding by them. Indeed, a recent study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found that positive attitudes toward conformism and obedience predict less disruptive innovation.

Japan failed to overtake the United States, even without heavy restrictions on the flow of ideas and an authoritarian regime that promotes obedience. Hence, the United States has critical advantages that should enable it to remain the world’s leader in artificial intelligence. If it cedes that position to China, the reason will likely be that Washington has tried to emulate the Chinese model by propping up national champions rather than embracing the competition and dynamism that have made the United States the world’s technological front-runner for more than a century.

#### U.S. ahead now, but win *isn’t inevitable* – regulatory environment of *next five* years is key

Allison 20 **–** Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School

Graham Allison, August 2020, "Is China Beating the U.S. to AI Supremacy?," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/china-beating-us-ai-supremacy>

Clues for a Winning Strategy

Is AI a race China is destined to win? With a population four times the size of the United States, there is no question that China will have the largest domestic market for AI applications. With many multiples of the United States in data, substantially larger numbers of computer scientists and a government for which there is a first-order priority, we can understand colleagues who are pessimistic. Indeed, it is our best judgment that on the current trajectory, while the United States will maintain a narrow lead over the next five years, China will then catch up and pass us quickly thereafter.

Nonetheless, we believe that this is an arena in which the United States can compete—and win. Congress recently established the “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence,” with Eric Schmidt as its chair, and Bob Work, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under both Obama and Trump, as Vice Chair. Its mission is to develop that strategy “to ensure America’s national security enterprise has the tools it needs to maintain U.S. global leadership.”55 In the hope of being helpful to that effort, we conclude with five pointers toward a winning strategy.

First, Americans must wake up to the challenge. Recognition that that the United States faces a serious competitor in a contest in which the outcome will be decisive for our future is necessary to get our competitive juices flowing. The Olympics offers an instructive analogy for thinking about a competitive strategy for AI. It also reminds us that competition is inherently a good thing. Competition produces superior performance. Participants in a marathon run faster than they do when running alone. Indeed, competition is a core American value. Free markets organize a competitive process that produces better products at cheaper prices. Science and its applications advance as research teams compete to better understand the world.56

Second, in this competition, the United States cannot hope to be the biggest—in that category, China wins by default due to the size of its population. However, what the United States can be is the smartest. In the seeking to improve and advance the most advanced of technologies, the brightest 0.0001 percent of individuals make the difference. The United States can succeed by recruiting talent from all 7.7 billion people on Earth and enabling these individuals to realize their full potential.57 In fact, U.S. companies have now recruited more than half of the top 100 recognized AI geniuses. In sharp contrast, China is a closed society—limited essentially to 1.4 billion Chinese speakers. Just 1000 foreign born individuals became Chinese citizens last year. So while the United States will not win competitions in which bulk numbers are the dominant factor, where brilliance, creativity and innovation matter most, the United States has a decisive advantage.58

Third, platforms matter. Here the United States begins with a huge sustainable competitive advantage: English is the universal language for science, business and the web. Chinese face the choice of either speaking English, or simply talking to themselves. Not only do the Chinese, but also the French and others often complain that this is unfair—and it may be. But it is a fact. To transform Singapore from a third-world city into one of the world’s most successful and prosperous global trading hubs, Lee Kuan Yew insisted on making English its first language. (Indeed, at one point in counseling Chinese leaders, he suggested that China make English its first language.) Today, more than half of the 7.5 billion people on Earth speak English—and another billion are seeking to learn.

Fourth, American companies have a significant first mover advantage in the establishment of the major platforms in AI, including operating systems (Android and Apple), design of advanced semiconductors (arm), and killer apps—including Instagram, YouTube and Facebook. Instagram has 1 billion monthly active users; Facebook more than 2.4 billion. While Chinese competitors will certainly attempt to displace the current leaders in both platforms and applications, if American companies are smart enough to continue enlarging their users’ opportunities, improving their experiences, and expanding the number of people using their platforms and applications, Chinese and others who want to speak to the world could have to continue relying on U.S.-dominated platforms.

#### Race real + already underway

Horowitz 18 – Michael C. Horowitz is a professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania.

Michael Horowitz, May 2018, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review, https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/

Whether AI capabilities diffuse relatively slowly or quickly, major military powers will likely face security dilemmas having to do with AI development and deployment. In a slow diffusion scenario, if countries fear that adversaries could get ahead in ways that are hard to rapidly mimic — and small differences in capabilities will matter on the battlefield — that will foster incentives for quick development and deployment. In a rapid diffusion scenario, competitive incentives will also exist, as countries feel like they have to race just to keep up.[114](https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/" \l "_ftn114) Moreover, it will be inherently difficult to measure competitors’ progress with AI (unlike, say, observing the construction of an aircraft carrier), causing countries to assume the worst of their potential rivals.

Competition in developing AI is underway. Countries around the world are investing heavily in AI, though the United States and China seem to be ahead. Yet even if the space-race analogy is not precise, understanding AI as a competition can still be useful. Such frameworks help people and organizations understand the world around them, from how to evaluate international threats to the potential trajectory of wars.[115](https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/" \l "_ftn115) If likening competition in AI to the space race clarifies the stakes in ways that generate incentives for bureaucratic action at the government level, and raises corporate and public awareness, the analogy stands to have utility for the United States.

#### Turn has no uniqueness bc AI race is inevitable – ONLY a question of *who wins*

Loss and Johnson 19 – Rafael Loss works at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He was a Fulbright fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Joseph Johnson is a Ph.D. candidate in computer science at Brigham Young University.

Rafael Loss and Joseph Johnson, September 19 2019, “WILL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IMPERIL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE?” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/will-artificial-intelligence-imperil-nuclear-deterrence/

On the other hand, situations might arise in which an imperfect but marginally AI-improved counter-force capability would be considered as good enough to order a strike against an adversary’s nuclear forces, especially when paired with [overconfidence in homeland missile defense](https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/deadly-overconfidence-trump-thinks-missile-defenses-work-against-north-korea-and-that-should-scare-you/). Particularly states with relatively small and vulnerable arsenals would find it hard to regard assurances that AI would not be used to target their nuclear weapons as credible. Their efforts to hedge against improving counter-force capabilities might include posture adjustments, such as pre-delegating launch authority or co-locating operational warheads with missile units, which could increase first-strike instability and heighten the risk of deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental nuclear use. Accordingly, future instabilities will be a product less of the independent effects of AI than of the perennial credibility problems associated with deterrence and reassurance in a world of ever-evolving capabilities.

#### Countries are pushing the limit on AI now – 0 uniqueness for the turn

Walch 20 – Kathleen Walch is Managing Partner & Principal Analyst at AI Focused Research and Advisory firm Cognilytica, a leading analyst firm focused on application and use of artificial intelligence (AI) in both the public and private sectors.

Kathleen Walch, February 9 2020, “Why The Race For AI Dominance Is More Global Than You Think,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2020/02/09/why-the-race-for-ai-dominance-is-more-global-than-you-think/?sh=22499c73121f

The Current Leaders in AI Funding and Dominance: US and China

AI startups are raising more money than ever. [AI-focused companies raised $12 Billion in 2017 alone](https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2129576/venture-capital-investment-ai-doubles-us12-billion-2017), more than doubling venture funding over the previous year. Most of this funding is concentrated in US and Chinese companies, but the source of those funds is much more international. Softbank, based in Japan, has amassed a $100 Billion investment fund, with many international investors including  Saudi Arabia’s sovereign investment fund and other global sources of capital. While US companies have put up significant investment rounds with the power of Silicon Valley’s VC funds, [China now has the most valuable AI startup](https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/08/sensetime-raises-600-million/), Sensetime, which raised over $1.2 Billion and a rumored additional $1 Billion raise on the way.

However, what makes AI as a technology sector different from previous major waves of investment, is that AI is seen as strategic technology by many governments. In 2017 China released a three step program outlining its goal to [become a world leader in A.I. by 2030.](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/21/china-ai-world-leader-by-2030.html)  The government aims to make the AI industry worth about $150 billion and is pushing for greater use of AI in a number of areas such as the military and smart cities.  Furthermore, the Chinese government has made big bets including a planned [$2.1 Billion AI-focused technology research park](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/china-is-building-a-giant-2-point-1-billion-ai-research-park.html). And in 2019 The [Beijing AI Principles](https://www.baai.ac.cn/blog/beijing-ai-principles) were released by a multistakeholder coalition including the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (BAAI), Peking University, Tsinghua University, Institute of Automation and Institute of Computing Technology in Chinese Academy of Sciences, and an AI industrial league involving firms like Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent.

In addition, the Chinese technology ecosystem has developed to become a powerhouse in its own right. China has many multi-billion dollar tech giants including Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, and Huawei Technologies, who are each heavily investing in AI. Chinese companies also work more closely with the Chinese government, and laws in China are the most relaxed with regards to customer privacy and use of AI technologies such as facial recognition on their citizens. China’s government has already embraced the use of facial recognition technology and has quickly adopted this technology in everyday use.  In most other counties such as the US for example, privacy concerns prevent pervasive use of facial recognition technology, but such concerns or impediments to adoption don’t exist in China.

The story of technology company creation and funding in the United States is already well known. Silicon Valley is both a region as well as a euphemism for the entire tech industry, showing how dominant the US has been for the past several decades with technology creation and adoption. Venture capital as an industry was invented and perfected in the US, and the result of that has been the creation of such enduring tech giants like Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, IBM and thousands of other technology firms big and small. Collectively trillions of dollars has been invested in these firms by private and public sector investors to create the technology industry as we know it today. Certainly, none of that is going away anytime soon.

In addition, the US has an extremely well developed and highly skilled labor pool with academic powerhouses and research institutions that continue to push the boundaries of what is capable with AI. What is notable is that even in the US, the dominance of Silicon Valley as a specific, San Francisco-bay geographic region is starting to slip. The New York city region has produced many large AI-focused technology firms, and research in the Boston-area centered around MIT and Harvard, Pittsburgh with Carnegie Mellon, the Washington, DC metro area with its legions of government-focused contractors and development shops, Southern California’s emerging tech ecosystem, Seattle-based Amazon and Microsoft, and many more locations in the US are loosening the hold that Northern California has on the technology industry with respect to AI. And just outside the US, Canadian firms from Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are further eroding the dominance of Silicon Valley with respect to AI.

In 2018 the United States issued an [Executive Order from the President naming AI](https://www.vox.com/2019/2/13/18222433/trump-executive-order-ai-explained) the second highest R&D priority after the security of the American people for the fiscal year 2020. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense [announced](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/07/defense-department-pledges-billions-toward-artificial-intelligence-research/?utm_term=.59e7de14cf96) it will invest up to $2 billion over the next five years towards the advancement of AI. As recently as 2020 the United States launched the American AI Initiative with the strategy aimed at focusing the federal government resources. The US federal government also launched [AI.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/ai/) to make it easier to access all of the governmental AI initiatives currently underway. Once potentially seen lackluster in comparison to that of China and other countries the US government has really started making AI a priority to keep up in recent years.

#### China’s rise wouldn’t be peaceful – detailed reading of motivations proves they’re moving strategically in response to U.S. presence and decline emboldens them

Mastro 15 – Professor of IR & Security Studies at Georgetown University

Oriana Skylar Mastro, assistant professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay, The Washington Quarterly 37:4, pp. 151–170, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002161>

As Chinese political, economic, and military power continues to grow at impressive rates, the impact of Chinese external behavior on the region has correspondingly increased. Since 2010, it has become commonplace for observers to refer to Chinese foreign policy behavior as abrasive, muscular, or assertive. However, China’s heightened willingness to rely on coercive diplomacy—or the simultaneous use of diplomacy and limited use of force to accomplish one’s objectives—began much earlier with the Impeccable incident in March 2009.1 In this case, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in dangerously close proximity to the U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable.2 In the following months, commentators predicted that China would moderate its behavior in the face of regional backlash. Instead, instances of Chinese platforms maneuvering in a dangerous and unprofessional manner only became more frequent. Whether Chinese foreign policy has become more assertiveness and the implications of such a shift are the source of great debate among China hands. Analysts Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe argue that stability still characterizes U.S.–China bilateral relations because the ties between the two countries are more extensive, varied, prioritized, and interdependent than ever before.3 Harvard professor Alastair Iain Johnston argues that pundits overstate the change because they underestimate how assertive China has been in the past— demonstrating that Chinese official discourse on sovereignty and territorial issues has been relatively consistent over the past fifteen years.4 Others argue that the narrative does not go far enough. Australian analyst Jeffrey Reeves articulated that accusations of assertiveness too narrowly focus on China’s THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 151expansive territorial claims, disruptive diplomacy in ASEAN, and growing use of economic sanctions, while ignoring other policies that contribute to regional instability—specifically Beijing’s reliance on economic ties to advance its relations with smaller developing countries in Asia.5 Commentators admittedly tend to ignore areas of cooperative Chinese actions such as convergence in U.S. and Chinese voting on the UN Security Council and increasing U.S. exports to China.6 Former State Department official Thomas Christensen cautions that China’s counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the United States are better understood as reactive and conservative, rather than assertive and innovative.7 Qin Yaqing, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, postulates that China’s main strategic policies— emphasis on U.S.–China relations, rejecting alliances, reliance on economic diplomacy—will continue even as some policies change. For instance, we could see an emphasis on core interests like sovereignty and territorial integrity, even over economic development.8 While true that Chinese diplomacy may not have, on the whole, become more assertive, most agree that in the area of maritime disputes, China has demonstrated an increased willingness to threaten and use limited force to promote its sovereignty claims. The dangerous Chinese interception of U.S. Navy planes conducting routine patrols above the South China Sea in late August 2014 is only the latest of countless instances of China credibly communicating its threats by increasing the risk of accident.9 Many U.S. strategists were hopeful that Beijing would moderate its behavior because, they argue, this more muscular approach to maritime disputes has obviously proved counterproductive and detrimental to China’s own interests. China’s muscle-flexing has driven allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia into a closer alliance with the United States.10 A recent Pew poll demonstrated that 70 percent of respondents in the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, and India expressed concern over potential conflict with China.11 “The Chinese,” said Rob Taylor, a close advisor to Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, “with their current foreign policy, as distinct from what they were doing over a decade ago—is [sic] genuinely counterproductive.”12 Given the Western consensus that, as The Economist wrote, “it would be hard to construct a foreign policy better designed to undermine China’s long-term interests,”13 and that fundamentally China “has no wish to be branded an international outlaw,”14 as Wall Street Journal columnist Andrew Browne pointed out, many are waiting for a reversion to previous policies. China has been credibly communicating its threats by increasing the risk of accident. Oriana Skylar Mastro 152 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 Unfortunately, such a shift back is unlikely. China’s reliance on coercion, both in the form of deterrence and compellence, over maritime disputes is likely to persist for the foreseeable future for two reasons. First, Chinese assertiveness is the result of a deliberate strategic decision central to Beijing’s overarching antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The Economist refers to anti-access as “the ability to prevent an opposing force from entering an area of operations.” The objective of area denial, on the other hand, is not prevention but disruption—to compel the desired behavior by “impos[ing] severe costs on the enemy’s freedom of action once it has [gained access].”15 While it seems counterintuitive, China is actually hoping to prevent balancingby being assertive, and operationally it is trying to create a domestic and international environment that will limit U.S. ability to intervene effectively in a given conflict. Second, there are influential and loud voices in China that believe such a strategy has been working, and is better than the alternatives. Such arguments are not without merit. While a few countries’ view of China is worsening, a median of 49 percent of the world’s publics surveyed in a 2014 poll still hold a positive view of China overall.16 Xi Jinping himself has articulated more hardline policies concerning territorial disputes, and Chinese assertiveness has noticeably increased under his watch. Additionally, the costs of any negative perceptions are unclear—even Australia has been hesitant to be drawn into the diplomatic fray given its close economic relationship with China.17 And even if countries are unhappy, it is hard to ignore the fact that China’s tactic of “exploit[ing] perceived provocations in disputed areas by other countries…to change the status quo in its favour,” as the International Crisis Group puts it, has been largely successful in strengthening China’s claims.18 In short, Chinese assertiveness is here to stay, and U.S. strategy needs to adjust accordingly. Specifically, I lay out three areas of Cold War-era concepts that the United States needs to jettison if it hopes to protect regional interests and avoid conflict if possible. Asia’s Own Balancing Most U.S. strategists and scholars argue that Chinese muscular behavior in its territorial disputes has been counterproductive in that China’s relations with its neighbors, and therefore Beijing’s security environment, have deteriorated as a result. Many concluded that Beijing was learning similar lessons and would adjust its foreign policy accordingly. China’s relentless pursuit of its territorial Unfortunately, a shift back from Chinese coercion is unlikely for two reasons. Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 153claims has hardened the position of its neighbors and hurt its international image.19 According to a 2014 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) poll of strategic elites in eleven countries, 61 percent of respondents felt China had a negative impact on regional security.20 More and more, regional actors’ anxiety about Beijing’s long-term intentions is encouraging them to conduct their own balancing. Such behavior includes external balancing, such as improving ties with the United States and other major players in the region, as well as internally strengthening and modernizing their own militaries.21 We can see this internal balancing in the defense spending of Asian countries, which spent a total of $287.4 billion on defense in 2012. This total represents the first time that Asian defense spending exceeded total European defense spending, including both NATO and non-NATO countries.22 Further, from 2008–2012, Asia and Oceania accounted for 47 percent of global imports of major conventional weapons, with India, South Korea, and Singapore—first, fourth, and fifth, respectively—all in the top five of importers of major conventional weapons worldwide.23 Real (inflation-adjusted) defense spending in India, Japan, and South Korea increased from 2000 to 2011 by 47, 46, and 67 percent, respectively, an increase too large to be explained by natural modernization trends.24 Moreover, the reversal of downward spending trends in 2008 and subsequent accelerated increases, coupled with focus on investment in naval and air forces, suggest such spending trends are partly in response to China.25 The Asia–Pacific will comprise 26 percent—nearly $200 billion—of global maritime security builds in the next 20 years, represented largely by shipbuilding.26 India has been the largest importer of weapons for the past five years and has more active duty military personnel than any other Asian country except China. India’s defense budget rose to $46.8 billion in 2012, and it is projected that by 2020 India will become the fourth-greatest defense spender in the world, overtaking Japan, France, and Britain.27 Even South Korea, a much smaller country, boosted its defense budget by 67 percent from $17.1 billion in 2000 to $28.6 billion in 2011.28 In terms of external balancing, many countries are strengthening their ties with the United States. In 2013, the United States and Vietnam established a comprehensive partnership, and subsequently have frequently worked together, for example to mobilize a multinational response in 2010 to China’s perceived attempts to promote its maritime claims in the South China Sea.29 In April 2014, the Philippines and the United States signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement that, among other things, allows the United States to base troops there on a rotational basis for the first time in 20 years.30 Later in 2014, Australia and the United States signed a 25-year agreement allowing 2500 U.S. Marines and USAF personnel to train there and inter-operate with Australian forces.31 Oriana Skylar Mastro 154 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015Japan has perhaps made the greatest changes by incrementally raising its defense budget, extending its security perimeter, improving its armaments, and considering boosting the status of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) by extending its operational range. Japanese defense spending in 2013 increased for the first time in eleven years by 40 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 4.7358 trillion yen.32 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced in July 2014 a reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution to allow, for the first time in sixty years, collective self-defense. This means that Japan’s military may engage in hostilities to come to the aid of friendly countries, such as the United States, even when Japan itself has not been attacked.33 In addition to strengthening relations with the United States, Asian countries are also expanding their ties with one another. To cite just a few examples, South Korea and Japan are gradually moving from security dialogue toward closer intelligence and defense cooperation. While a painful history limits the level of trust between the two countries, officials in Seoul and Tokyo are quietly moving ahead with strengthening both bilateral relations and trilateral cooperation with the United States. Korea is also becoming a major economic partner, arms provider, and trainer for select Southeast Asian states including Indonesia and Vietnam. Japan and India have also upgraded bilateral defense ties and have pledged to enhance cooperation, especially in the realm of maritime security; to that end, the two countries held the first purely bilateral joint naval exercise off the Bay of Tokyo in June 2012. Japan and Australia have signed an accord to cross-service logistics for military platforms. Japan has also moved to improve defense relations with Vietnam and the Philippines. Due to China’s sensitivities, Australia tends to downplay its cooperation with Japan, but it is far more vocal about strengthening ties with India, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Japan, Australia, and ASEAN members increasingly seek after India, with its “Look East” policy, recast in November 2014 by Prime Minister Modi as its “Act East” policy, and blue-water naval power. India provides arms and professional military training, especially of junior officers, to Vietnam, and Hanoi has granted India berthing rights at its Nha Trang port.34 A Deliberate Strategy Chinese assertive behavior is here to stay because it is the manifestation of a deliberate long-term strategy. Many scholars are more comfortable arguing that a rogue military, a need to cater to Chinese nationalism, or individual leadership traits explain Chinese assertiveness because those explanations suggest China’s dangerous and provocative behavior is a temporary paroxysm.35 But the speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlight the belief that unfriendly, and even hostile, powers are besieging China, especially in the maritime sphere. Wang Yi has emphasized that China periodically exercises restraint, but must stand its ground when provoked in territorial disputes.36 In a May 2013 speech in Germany, Li Keqiang suggested that Chinese assertiveness is even in defense of the post-World War II international system. Though a tenuous connection, Li basically insinuates that China’s active pursuit of its East China Sea claims supports the world order laid out in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.37 And in recent months, Xi himself has publicly stressed the critical importance of a strong military to a successful foreign policy and dismissed the option of passivity.38 Remaining firm is the preferred official Chinese approach. Xi Jinping has also emphasized the importance of prioritizing the economic interests of countries that support Chinese core interests, even if it comes at a relative cost economically.39 Past economic goals solely prioritized making money, with little consideration to strategic factors—but today, Chinese leaders are starting to think about how they can use the immense economic benefit of doing business with China in order to gain political influence. The political priority seems to be defending maritime sovereignty above all else. Historically, upholding maritime sovereignty has been critical to a nation’s success, and therefore China should follow a similar trajectory of building a powerful navy that can protect its commercial interests.40 Researchers at Peking University pulled together extensive statistics to demonstrate how important maritime territory is for Chinese economic, and therefore national, interests. They argue that China must utilize available resources to defend vital sea lanes, which include military, diplomatic, and economic wherewithal.41 Meanwhile, China’s top leadership stresses that in spite of China’s assertiveness in maritime disputes, other countries need not worry about China’s rise because it does not seek hegemony or promote imperialism. An anonymous analysis published in the Hong Kong Economic Times of Xi Jinping’s November speech concludes that his foreign policy approach is tough and unyielding, though not unnecessarily aggressive.42 China is unlikely to shift strategies away from relying on coercion and manipulating risk to achieve its territorial objectives not only because the top leadership publicly promotes them, but also because they correspond well with China’s overarching strategy of active defense (jiji fangyu). Active defense is the operational component of Jiang Zemin’s National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period (xin shiqi guojia junshi zhanlue fangzhen), which serves as “the highest level of strategic guidance for all PLA military operations during war and preparation for war during peacetime.”43 Specifically, the guidelines Oriana Skylar Mastro 156 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY & WINTER 2015 necessitate developing capabilities to deter, deny, disrupt, and delay the deployment of U.S. forces into the Chinese theater—hence the Western nomenclature A2/AD. These can be leveraged to accomplish Chinese goals in its maritime disputes through four distinct but interrelated pathways: 1. geographic: increasing the distance and time required for U.S. forces to arrive in theater from areas of safety before China achieves its political objectives; 2. kinetic: degrading the U.S. military’s ability to penetrate anti-access environments with an enhanced conventional precision strike system, consisting mainly of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as attacks on key enabling capabilities such as space-based networks that enable C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions; 3. political: exploiting perceived weaknesses in political support and resolve of U.S. allies and friends, thereby keeping the United States out because countries will not allow it to base there; and 4. deterrent: making involvement so costly that the United States opts out of responding, or responds minimally, in a given contingency.44 Assertiveness is therefore, in many ways, the logical extension of this Chinese strategy as it grows more confident in the capabilities it has been developing over the last twenty years as part of this active defense strategy. While the strategic objective is the same for each of the pillars, the theory of victory of the first two pillars is significantly different from that of the latter two. Kinetic and geographic aspects rely largely on brute force in that China could theoretically accomplish its goals by force alone, without any collaboration from the United States.45 Take this hypothetical example—if in the early stages of a conflict, China attacks U.S. bases in Japan, cratering runaways and burying aircraft, no amount of U.S. resolve will make those planes fly. In this case, the United States may want to support a Taiwan contingency but be unable to do so. Coercive strategies, meanwhile, rely on the collaboration of the opponent; one can only succeed if the other side concedes. If China instead lobs missiles at U.S. bases every other day until the United States agrees to halt surveillance operations in the South China Sea, this is coercion. The political and deterrent (third and fourth) pillars are thus harder to grasp because their theory of victory relies on compliance. They are premised on the belief that China can convince countries not to put up a fight by manipulating risk and imposing costs. Chinese assertiveness in maritime disputes since 2009 is largely coercive in nature, and therefore tends to fall under these last two pillars. While the kinetic and geographic components of China’s active defense approach have received the most attention in Washington policy circles, the more elusive political and deterrent A2/AD pillars can be just as effective, if not more so, in undermining U.S. ability to project power in the region to intervene in a maritime dispute. The political pillar refers to the idea that, in a conflict, China will pressure countries with military threats or economic inducements to limit or deny the U.S. use of facilities necessary for power projection into the East China Sea, South China Sea, or Taiwan Strait. As Congressional Research Service naval expert Ronald O’Rourke convincingly argues, “To threaten regional bases and logistics points, China could employ SRBM/MRBMs [shortrange and medium-range ballistic missiles], land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces, and computer network attack (CNA). Strike aircraft, when enabled by aerial refueling, could simultaneously engage distant targets using air-launched cruise missiles equipped with a variety of terminal-homing warheads.”46 Even during peacetime, though most countries want the United States to remain in the region, the priority on stability above all else may translate to nations throughout the region pressuring the United States to accept a greater degree of parity with China, thereby displacing U.S. influence, and perhaps eventually presence, in the region to a certain degree. An example of such efforts came from Chinese defense strategist and retired senior military officer Song Xiaojun. In a May 2012 opinion piece, Song warned Australia that it could not reconcile its close economic relationship with China with the fact that it relies on the United States for security, and would have to, at some point, choose which country to prioritize in its foreign-policy decision making. He argued that “Australia has to find a godfather sooner or later,” and whom Canberra chooses “depends on who is more powerful based on the strategic environment.”47 An editorial in a nationalist Chinese state-run newspaper also responded to the news that the United States will station 2500 Marines in Darwin with the warning that Canberra is risking getting itself “caught in the cross fire” between China and the United States.48 The deterrent A2/AD pillar—perhaps the most important and most difficult to counter—posits that Washington may opt out of responding in a number of contingencies, for example maritime disputes, given that China’s active defense initiatives exceed the political costs for the United States. This could involve deterring a U.S. intervention decision altogether, or involve a Beijing-directed preemptive strike on U.S. forces attempting to deploy to the region, in the hopes of delivering the necessary psychological shock to the United States, its allies, and friends in the region. China’s public response to the 2012 U.S. declaration that it will rebalance toward Asia reflects China’s beliefs underpinning the deterrent pillar. The main theme found throughout Chinese media sources has been that the United States is too weak-willed to carry through its policies, which are in any case ill-advised. The Chinese media further claims that the past ten years of U.S. war in Southwest Asia has eroded the U.S. sphere of influence and has seriously affected the state of U.S. regional hegemony in the western Pacific.49 Chinese writers also note that, while the United States may want, theoretically, to return to being the main force in the Asia–Pacific, its economic dependence on China and its relative depletion of resources imply that it will fail to fulfill its proclamations and promises.50 In short, so the argument goes, while the United States wants to protect vital regional interests in East Asia, its desire to do so at an acceptable cost trumps all other considerations. Concordant with this view, China believes it can increase the real and perceived costs of intervention and successfully convince the United States to restrain itself in maritime disputes and other regional contingencies. The ultimate aim of China’s assertiveness, therefore, is effectively to convince the United States to self-impose an anti-access doctrine in any conflict involving Chinese territorial interests. China’s Positive Assessment of Assertiveness The positive internal assessment of China’s assertiveness strategy is the second reason why Beijing is unlikely to change course. In part because of all this evident reaction to Chinese behavior, Chinese scholars and strategists themselves are debating the relative merits and risks associated with Chinese assertiveness, a strategy that Xi Jinping himself articulated in an October 2013 speech at the foreign affairs conference of the Chinese Communist Party as striving for achievement (fenfayouwei).51 Since 1990, China had adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of keeping a low profile while still getting things done (taoguangyouhui, yousuozuowei). Many Chinese scholars warn against jettisoning this strategy.52 But domestic support for a more assertive, confident, proactive foreign policy is growing. Even scholars that prefer to stay loyal to Deng’s maxim say it’s time to stress the second part, “actively getting something done” (yousuozuowei). Chinese proponents rely on two main rationales supporting the shift in foreign policy approach that provide insight into what lies ahead. First, the previous policy of taoguangyouhui was insufficient to protect national interests because it did not persuade others to respect China’s interests in the region. Second, while some admit that the United States and neighboring countries are uncomfortable with the new approach, they argue it is more practical and effective than reverting to a China that suffers disgraces and insults in order to “bide time.” As China’s power grows, its leaders are prioritizing strategies that they think command respect and will persuade others to increasingly accommodate Chinese preferences. Many Chinese thinkers complain that the potential benefits of keeping a low profile—a positive international image or greater support and friendship from neighboring countries—have failed to come to fruition.53 Neighboring powers were suspicious of China’s rise long before the foreign policy shift, and the behavior of other South China Sea claimants during that period suggest that an “unprincipled” strategy like biding time does not command respect.54 According to Fudan University researcher Zhao Huasheng, while China will promote policies that resolve disputes in a reasonable way, core interests cannot “be shelved” to be dealt with at a later date, regardless of how much turmoil they cause now.55 Other voices add that placating others did not keep Vietnam and the Philippines from violating China’s sovereignty, or Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from visiting the Yasukuni shrine.56 One prominent scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) commented in a recent interview that China had tensions with its neighbors even when its strategy was pliant, flexible, and gentle, because contemporary security issues result from China’s rise.57 As one Chinese major general argued, principles of harmonious co-existence and peaceful development do not resonate with many countries, and China’s promotion of these ideas was like “playing the zither to a cow”—ineffective.58 While Chinese strategists recognize that other regional actors are unhappy with the shift, they also argue that both China domestically and other countries internationally are still in the process of acclimating to China’s new foreign policy approach. These strategists argue that the palpable anxiety of the United States and some neighboring countries is completely understandable, but does not suggest the strategy is ineffective. The argument goes something like this: countries are used to a weak and accommodating (renru fuzhong) China, so they are understandably startled by China’s recent tendency to push back.59 In other words, they will adjust, but the strategy should not change. According to an article in the Chinese nationalistic newspaper The Global Times, China’s comprehensive national power has reached a point where it is time “to actively get something done,” the latter part of Deng’s biding time maxim.60 Many pair their support for this more proactive foreign policy approach with words of caution—China needs to learn how to use its power so as to command respect without being unnecessarily quarrelsome or prideful. This is a critical period for China’s rise, and the last thing the country needs is to provoke robust balancing designed to thwart China’s rise.61 Oriana Skylar Mastro One of the greatest proponents of the “striving for achievement” strategy, Tsinghua University professor Yan Xuetong, argues that the strategy has actually contributed greatly to improvements in China’s international situation.62 When China was laying low, focusing on economic development and attempting to expand its soft power, countries were still anxious about Chinese intentions and increasingly saw China as a threat. But, Yan argues, countries like the United States and Japan will inevitably see China as a threat, because China will likely replace them as the region’s strongest and richest country, respectively. Contrary to Western arguments, Yan believes that major competitors have been accommodating China’s preferences more and more, largely due to China’s increased assertiveness. He cites U.S. acceptance of the November 2013 announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ); Washington’s moderate reaction to the December 2013 Cowpens incident, in which a PLAN Amphibious Dock Ship maneuvered dangerously close to the U.S. ship; and President Obama’s downgrading of his February 2014 visit with the Dalai Lama to the Map Room instead of the Oval office as examples of the strategy’s success. 63 He also argues that bilateral relations are more stable with the United States because both Beijing and Washington now admit to a structural conflict, and therefore preclude unreasonable expectations for favorable actions that then lead to overreaction and disappointment.64 The key for continued success, he argues, is to seek strategic partnerships with countries not based on where China can make the most money, but on which countries have the most clout strategically. There are differing opinions on the relative merits of various strategies, but as one Chinese scholar warned, China must show a united front so as not to send the wrong message of confusion or lack of consensus to the outside world.65 As an opinion piece in China’s nationalist newspaper The Global Times argues, the international community wants China to be a responsible stakeholder and proactive in some areas, but “swallow its anger” in others. It goes on to say that even if China tried to adhere to these expectations, this would only convince the international community that China is weak and can be bullied, the wrong message to send and the wrong strategy to implement if the goal is protecting Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.66 This suggests that even if some Chinese thinkers disagreed with this interpretation of assertiveness leading to great foreign policy achievements, Chinese leaders may bury this dissent and double down on its preferred methods of promoting foreign policy interests regardless. U.S. Strategic Response: What More Can Be Done? If China’s tendency to rely on coercive diplomacy to promote its territorial claims indeed persists, as I have argued, what does that mean for U.S. policy? Many officials are hoping that balancing within Asia and positive trends in other aspects of the bilateral relationship will prove sufficient to manage China’s abrasive behavior in territorial disputes. Secretary of State John Kerry argued that creating sustainable growth, enhancing economic ties, and empowering the individual to improve their communities will ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia–Pacific.67 The idea that engagement and partnership will shape China’s choices and change how the leadership defines its national interests and the best way to promote them is also a strong theme among U.S. officials. The current ambassador to China, Max Baucus, put forth his plan to “partner with China as it emerges as a global power and encourage it to act responsibly in resolving international disputes, respecting human rights, and protecting the environment.”68 Everyone agrees that engagement should not be abandoned. Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Miche`le Flournoy argued, “abandoning efforts to engage with China would likely accelerate Beijing’s assertiveness and run counter to a wide range of U.S. economic and security interests.”69 Thomas Christensen posits that the United States can empower moderate elites in China by “consistently offer[ing] China an active role in multilateral cooperative efforts.”70 George Washington University professor Robert Sutter argues, “through constructive engagement with their Chinese counterparts, U.S. leaders can demonstrate the long-term benefits Beijing would enjoy from a Chinese regional posture that eschews egregious pressure, intimidation, and zero-sum competition and embraces existing world norms that hold promise for uninterrupted Chinese development.”71 Scholars, policymakers, and officials stress that containment, defined as “attempting to suppress [China’s] growth by isolating Beijing from its neighbors and the world” is not the answer.72 But containment is not the only Cold War paradigm that deserves casting off given the contemporary challenges of a rising China. Many scholars have offered specific recommendations on how to address these challenges, with most designed to impose costs to compel a change in Chinese assertive behavior. But such measures are unlikely to be implemented effectively, or at all, until policymakers and strategists abandon two different elements of a Cold War mentality: overly relying on a strong forward military presence for a credible deterrent and fixating on de-escalation in crises. In its place, U.S. officials must accept risk without being reckless, and it must permit the possibility of escalation while maintaining stability. The U.S. mindset needs to shift to accept greater risk without being reckless. Military power alone does not guarantee a credible deterrent. U.S. efforts to bolster its military presence in the Asia–Pacific—a central pillar of the rebalancing strategy—counter the geographic, kinetic and political pillars of China’s A2/AD strategy. For example, the United States is forward-deploying more assets in the region, such as the Marine Air Ground Task Force Detachment already deployed to Australia as well as the stated goal of positioning 60 percent of all U.S. warships to the Asia–Pacific by 2020. This addresses the geographic pillar. Attempts to address the kinetic pillar include new operational concepts such as Air-Sea Battle, which “relies on highly integrated and tightly coordinated operations across war-fighting domains” in order “to disrupt and destroy enemy A2-AD networks and their defensive and offensive guided weapons systems in order to enable US freedom of action to conduct concurrent and follow-on operations.”73 Bolstering U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Singapore, Vietnam, and New Zealand are critical components to U.S. efforts to ensure political access and support in the region. These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia. China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight. The U.S. focus on de-escalation in all situations only exacerbates this issue. The Cold War experience solidified the Western narrative stemming from World War I that inadvertent escalation causes major war, and therefore crisis management is the key to maintaining peace.74 This has created a situation in which the main U.S. goal has been de-escalation in each crisis or incident with Beijing. But Chinese leaders do not share this mindset—they believe leaders deliberately control the escalation process and therefore wars happen because leaders decide at a given juncture that the best option is to fight.75 China is masterful at chipping away at U.S. credibility through advancing militarization and coercive diplomacy. It often uses limited military action to credibly signal its willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. Strategist Thomas Schelling theoretically captured this approach when he wrote it is “the sheer inability to predict the consequences of our actions and to keep things under control … that can intimidate the enemy.”76 Because China introduces risk for exactly this reason, the U.S. focus on deescalation through crisis management is unlikely to produce any change in Chinese behavior—if anything it will only encourage greater provocations. Beijing has identified the U.S. fear of inadvertent escalation, and is exploiting it to compel the United States to give in to its demands and preferences. In this way, the U.S. focus on de-escalation may actually be the source of instability by rewarding and encouraging further Chinese provocations. To signal to China that the United States will not opt out of a conflict, Washington must signal willingness to escalate to higher levels of conflict when China is directly and purposely testing U.S. resolve. This may include reducing channels of communication during a conflict, or involving additional regional actors, to credibly demonstrate that China will not be able to use asymmetry of resolve to its advantage. The current mindset—that crisis management is the answer in all scenarios— will be difficult to dislodge, given the tendency among U.S. military ranks to focus on worst-case “great battle” scenarios. While realistic in Cold War operational planning, decision makers should consider instead the less violent and prolonged engagements that characterize Chinese coercive diplomacy when evaluating risk and reward, such as the 1962 Sino–Indian War or the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands. The idea that any conflict with China would escalate to a major war, destroy the global economy, and perhaps even escalate to a nuclear exchange has no foundation in Chinese thinking, and causes the United States to concede in even the smallest encounters. While the Chinese leadership has proven to be more risk-acceptant than the United States (or perhaps more accurately, to assess the risks to be less than those perceived by U.S. strategists), Xi still wants to avoid an armed conflict at this stage. In his November 2014 keynote address at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he noted that China remains in a period of strategic opportunity in which efforts should be made to maintain the benign strategic environment so as to focus on internal development.77 Ultimately, the U.S. regional objective must be peace and stability at an acceptable cost. Given this, it is critical to understand the four components of China’s A2/AD strategy, the strategic foundation for China’s recent assertiveness, and how best to maintain the U.S. position as a Pacific power. In addition to regularly attending meetings in the region and developing new technology, new platforms, and new operational concepts designed to defeat China’s A2/AD strategy, the United States needs to break free of its Cold Warbased paradigm paralysis and rethink conceptions of limited war, escalation, and risk. Scolding China and imposing symbolic costs for each maritime incident is unlikely to inspire the corrective change U.S. thinkers are hoping for. The United States needs to fundamentally change its approach by accepting higher risk and allowing for the possibility of escalation—both vertically in force as well as horizontally to include other countries. This admittedly is a difficult balance, especially given the need to avoid emboldening U.S. allies to take actions that run contrary to U.S. interests. But only by mastering these two balancing acts—focusing on balancing resolve, rather than forces, and prioritizing stability over crisis management—will the United States be able to maintain peace and stability in East Asia without sacrificing U.S. or allied interests.

### Case

#### Neg impacts structurally outweigh – better to stick with the devil we know – don’t take the leap of faith toward retrenchment

Brooks and Wohlforth ’16 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University

Stephen Brooks, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 195-197.

The Devil We Know

Ultimately, the United States’ globe-girdling grand strategy is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged United States is the devil we don’t know. Retrenchment would in essence entail a massive experiment: How would the world work without a globally engaged America? That raises a critical question: What are the things that proponents of disengagement must presume will go right in order for their recommended strategic posture to really be less costly and less risky than deep engagement? Retrenchment proponents do not answer in any detail. This silence is telling, for their most penetrating criticisms of deep engagement are not about the cost/benefit ratio of sustaining the grand strategy itself but are instead about the temptations of moving beyond it or responding to its challenges in a suboptimally escalatory manner. Any effort to pull back from the world would also present the United States with temptations and potential challenges of implementation; it is just harder to call them to mind because we have no relevant recent experience with this kind of foreign policy stance.

Disengagement faces the same key potential pitfall as deep engagement: the temptation to overdo it. Just as deep engagement courts pressure from those who push for Washington to do too much, disengagement courts pressure from those who might want to do too little. And just as there are deep traditions and attitudes within the American body politic that periodically push policies that lie outside deep engagement’s logic, so too are there political forces and traditions that might push for policies outside the logic of the kind of strategic disengagement that retrenchment proponents advocate. Deep engagement’s critics in the academy are not isolationists. They favor decoupling the United States’ military commitments from Eurasia, but not pulling back from an embrace of economic globalization. But in the real world the political movement that might be attracted to retrenchment might not be so discriminating; the foreign policy pronouncements of Donald Trump on the campaign trail have made this evidently clear: on top of the same basic batch of new security policies that retrenchment proponents favor, he adds greatly augmented protectionism and immigration restrictions—which they have not advocated.

The bottom line is that there is ample evidence today of powerfully inward-looking attitudes and preferences in the American body politic, and it is not hard to imagine where they might want to push a United States that had opted to pull back from the world. And if the United States did dramatically pull back, fixing the resulting mess might get very expensive indeed. As we noted in chapter 7, once the United States sheds allies, access, and military infrastructure abroad and at home, the costs of re-engaging in some key region, should it become necessary, escalate dramatically. And should the United States pull back from seeking to manage the world economy, should it decide again as it did in the 1930s to try to wall itself off from the vicissitude of global commerce, the damage might not be reparable. If it could be repaired, it would likely take an extremely long time; consider that it was not until the 1970s that global trade flows exceeded the level that existed just prior to America’s imposition of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930.

It is all too easy to think of other ways retrenchment might be taken in directions unforeseen by its advocates, but even if it were implemented perfectly, it rests on what many might see as optimistic assumptions about the robustness of the current, and largely favorable, global order. Most important are the expectations that any disruptions to the order from the shock of a US pullback would be minor, borne mainly by others, and ultimately less costly to the United States than sustaining deep engagement. In other words, retrenchment proponents assume either that today’s economic and institutional order does not need to be backstopped by US deep engagement or, to the degree that it does, that it is just not important enough to the United Stated to warrant the cost of a deeply engaged grand strategy.

This book has shown that the weight of scholarship casts strong doubt on those assumptions. Ending the US leadership role would put the institutional order—necessary for managing the global economy as well as other transnational issues—at risk. Withdrawing US security guarantees would raise security tensions in regions, potentially generating conflict that could harm US economic interests and ultimately its security as well. A newly insecure and leaderless world would be much more prone to nuclear proliferation. To their credit, a number of retrenchment proponents acknowledge these risks, just as we have acknowledged deep engagement’s potential pitfalls. The chief response of these analysts is that these risks are most likely to be borne by other states, and so the costs they might impose on the United States are likely to be less than the costs of sustaining deep engagement.

To take that bet, one must believe that the United States is well insulated from potential disruptions abroad. This book shows that the odds on that bet are unfavorable across a range of issues. Retrenchment proponents discount some of these, like cooperation in international institutions, but they clearly agree that economic well-being is a basic US interest. And grand strategic retrenchment would be a wager on the proposition that economic globalization would not be disrupted by any regional security competition or war that emerged as a result of US withdrawal or that, if it is disrupted, US firms and investors can avoid being significantly harmed by any turbulence in the markets. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press are the only retrenchment proponents who examine the global economy in any depth, and they have a noteworthy faith in economic globalization simultaneously being remarkably resilient and yet also highly adaptable. They argue that US firms and investors will be able to adapt, and that economic costs from any turbulence in the markets will be lower than the costs of deep engagement. Although they do not say why they expect this to be the case, they appear to presume cooperation on the global economy will continue relatively unhindered without a single leading state that can use alliance relationships to help broker favorable bargains. Finally, they predict that global oil markets will remain efficient and oil prices will always quickly stabilize if a conflict emerges in a major oil-producing region.

#### American primacy is preferable to all alternatives – even if it isn’t perfect, you shouldn’t abandon massive progress since 1945

Kagan ’18 - Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings

Robert Kagan, “The World America Made—and Trump Wants to Unmake,” POLITICO Magazine, September 28, 2018, <https://politi.co/2zB3qCg>.

Critics at home and abroad condemned American hypocrisy, just as the critics do today. They questioned the legitimacy of an order that claimed to be rules-based but was often shaped by the American hegemon’s perception of its own interests. During the Vietnam War, millions of Europeans went into the streets to condemn American policy; in the Reagan years millions more protested the deployment of American intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. In the 1960s, France under postwar leader Charles de Gaulle pulled out of NATO and Germany’s chancellor Willy Brandt pursued an Ostpolitik of rapprochement with East Germany and the Soviet Union that defied American wishes.

Yet for all the shortcomings and despite America’s often high-handed and hypocritical behavior, none of the members of the liberal order—not one—ever sought to leave it. For America’s allies in Europe and Asia and elsewhere, even a flawed American world order was preferable to the alternative, and not just the Soviet alternative but the old European alternative. The Europeans never feared American aggression against them, despite America’s overwhelming military power. They trusted the United States not to exploit its superior power at their expense. Although Americans were selfish, like any people, the Europeans recognized that they were acting on a more complex and expansive definition of self-interest, that the United States was invested in preserving an order that, to work, had to enjoy some degree of voluntary acceptance by its members. Flawed as this system might be—flawed as the Americans were—in the real world this was as good as it was likely to get. The order held together because the other members regarded American hegemony, by any realistic standards, as relatively benign, and superior to the alternatives.

The liberal world order produced extraordinary progress. States and societies within it became more humane in the treatment of their citizens, increasingly respectful of free speech, a free press, and the right to protest and dissent. The poor were better cared for. Rights were continually expanded to hitherto unprotected minorities. Racialism and tribalism were dampened in favor of a growing cosmopolitanism. Extreme forms of nationalism diminished. The liberal world was far from perfect—injustice persisted, along with killing, bigotry and brutality, in the United States and elsewhere. It was still the City of Man and not the City of God. But compared with what had come before over the previous five thousand years, it was a revolutionary transformation of human existence.

There was a self-reinforcing quality to the progress within the order. As liberal norms evolved, all liberal nations came under pressure to live up to them, including the United States. It was not accidental that the greatest advances in American civil rights occurred in the decades after World War II. African-Americans had fought and died on European and Pacific battlefields on behalf of ideals their country had yet to realize—and the disjuncture became increasingly untenable.

#### Even if transitioning now, walking away from the world order is an UNPRECEDENTED shift – proves the link OUTWEIGHS the thumper

Mitchell 15 – President, Center for European Policy Analysis

Wess Mitchell, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington D.C. public policy research institute dedicated to the study of Central Europe, Against U.S. retrenchment from Europe and NATO, 2015, *Defence Matters,* <https://www.defencematters.org/news/against-u-s-retrenchment-from-europe-and-nato/311/>

This last point is perhaps the most critical, as it undermines the whole purpose of what the “tough love” school is trying to achieve by experimenting with retrenchment: managing the transition to a more multipolar international system. Already, in just a few months’ time, the Obama Administration has called into question sixty years’ worth of U.S. regional commitments and foreign-policy operating principles. This has arguably emboldened would-be U.S. global rivals like China into taking a more aggressive geopolitical course than they otherwise would be countenancing. Walking away from NATO now would be the final straw, accelerating the destabilization of various strategically-vital hinge points around the globe. Perhaps these things would have eventually come anyways, regardless of what the United States does. But we should seek to manage them on our own terms – not on an artificial timetable. If we are exiting unipolarity, the timing and nature of the “dismount” is everything. Why unnecessarily provoke geopolitical change on terms unfavorable to us through bad timing and a desire for experimentation?

Even if the United States does eventually decide that it is time to rethink our sixty-year strategy of providing a forward deployed presence and viable security guarantees in Europe and Asia in favor of genuine Offshore Balancing (which I do not support), it should do so in a way that leaves stability rather than instability in its wake, lest we reawaken old security faultlines best left dormant, enter multipolarity on unfavorable terms and potentially pay the price in Europe yet again for a bill that was three times paid in the last century. Then we would be right back to where we started sixty years ago, only with a worse hand and having to pay a higher cost than if we had never backed away from an institution which, though deeply flawed, is providing a service to the American Republic and far better than the alternative that would likely come in its place.

Sorry, Dr. Bacevich, it is not time for retrenchment.

#### No counterbalancing – strong forward presence keeps the peace

Dowd 15 – Senior Fellow, Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose

Alan Dowd, Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence, first published in print edition of Providence Magazine, 2015, available online at https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the only thing that keeps the peace, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

#### Russia-China coop isn’t a threat AND cozying up to Putin emboldens Russian and Chinese bad behavior – link turns everything AND bolsters deterrence offense

Carafano 8/5/19 - Heritage Foundation vice president, directs the think tank’s research on matters of foreign relations and national security

James Jay Carafano, “Why the China-Russia Alliance Won’t Last,” The National Interest, August 5, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-china-russia-alliance-wont-last-71556>.

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation.

My advice to them: Just stop.

Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash.

Siren’s Cat Call

Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China.

This is an idea that should be dumped into the dustbin before it has any history.

Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests.

They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them.

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.

Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.

On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.”

Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon.

Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works.

If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.

We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.

The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more.

All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese power is largely asymmetrical. They have very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.

Strategic Friction

There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship.

For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces.

And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo?

Play the Long Great Power Game

The world doesn’t require a twenty-first century Bismarck. The United States will do better simply by continuing its strategy of pushing back on Russia and China, while letting them know there’s an off-ramp waiting for them if—and only if—they respect U.S. interests.

Sure, this makes double duty for Washington. The United States has to mitigate Moscow’s efforts to destabilize Europe, even as it pushes for a free and open Indo-Pacific. But these tasks are not beyond our capabilities—and for us the pain is worth the gain.

Rather than try to pry Putin and Xi Jinping apart, Trump should continue to squeeze them from both sides. The natural friction in the Russian and Chinese relationship will prevent them from effectively ganging up on the United States. And it wouldn’t hurt if the United States should find subtle ways to remind them that they would foolish to trust each other too much.

The primary interest of both Putin and Xi is to assure the survival of their regimes. The American squeeze play will leave them with little choice but to accept the fact that America is strong, it’s here to stay, and their regimes have to live with it. This is the only kind of global balancing that will bring about stable relationships in the long-term.